Abstract
Is Moore’s principle of organic unities true? Does it matter whether it is? I argue that it is true and important. I defend the principle of organic unites and the view that intrinsic value can be defeated by presenting examples of the defeat of intrinsic value. I next respond to two objections. The first claims the examples fail since the allegedly defeated parts lack actual intrinsic value—they are “evaluatively inadequate”. The second is that the principle of organic unities lacks “theoretical significance” since there is no precise way to measure intrinsic value. Finally, I illustrate the importance of the principle by considering the Indispensability Argument which claims that if some type of good is an indispensable good, then it is the only good, that pluralism must be false. I argue that appealing to the concept of defeat allows the pluralist to consistently hold both that pluralism is true and that some goods are indispensable for a life or a world to be very good. Since the debate between pluralists and monists in axiology is important and since the concept of defeat provides the pluralist with a reasonable way to reply to the Indispensability Argument, the principle of organic unities is important.