Philosophical Studies 165 (3):1033-1046 (2013)

Authors
Daniel Halliday
Stanford University
Abstract
G.E. Moore’s principle of organic unity holds that the intrinsic value of a whole may differ from the sum of the intrinsic values of its parts. Moore combined this principle with invariabilism about intrinsic value: An item’s intrinsic value depends solely on its bearer’s intrinsic properties, not on which wholes it has membership of. It is often said that invariabilism ought to be rejected in favour of what might be called ‘conditionalism’ about intrinsic value. This paper is an attempt to show how invariabilism might be filled out in ways that allow its proponents to answer their conditionalist opponents. The main point consists in identifying how some amount of extrinsic part-value may contribute to whole-value that is nevertheless intrinsic. This enables an invariabilist to explain how the intrinsic value of a whole may differ from the sum of its intrinsic part-values, without abandoning the Moorean doctrine that intrinsic value supervenes on intrinsic properties (the proposal is nevertheless consistent with the view that invariabilist and conditionalist accounts might exist side by side). I finish with a brief explanation of how the main proposal could help construct invariabilist accounts of particular organic unities, looking beyond the more general argument they have with conditionalists.
Keywords Moore  Holism  Intrinsic value  Extrinsic value  Invariabilism  Organic unity
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 1033–1046, 2013
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1007/s11098-012-0007-4
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 69,177
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Principia Ethica.George Edward Moore - 1903 - Dover Publications.
Ethics Without Principles.Jonathan Dancy - 2004 - Oxford University Press.
Principia Ethica.G. E. Moore - 1903 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 13 (3):7-9.
Two Distinctions in Goodness.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1983 - Philosophical Review 92 (2):169-195.

View all 30 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Mereological Dominance and Simpson’s Paradox.Tung-Ying Wu - 2020 - Philosophia: Philosophical Quarterly of Israel 48 (1):391–404.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Is Intrinsic Value Conditional?Ben Bradley - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 107 (1):23 - 44.
Two Kinds of Organic Unity.Thomas Hurka - 1998 - The Journal of Ethics 2 (4):299-320.
Rethinking Intrinsic Value.Shelly Kagan - 1998 - The Journal of Ethics 2 (4):277-297.
Intrinsic Value and the Supervenience Principle.Dale Dorsey - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (2):267-285.
Hyperventilating About Intrinsic Value.Fred Feldman - 1998 - The Journal of Ethics 2 (4):339-354.
Why There is No Evidence for the Intrinsic Value of Non-Humans. Svoboda - 2011 - Ethics and the Environment 16 (2):25-36.
Intrinsic Value and the Argument From Regress.Julia Tanner - 2007 - Forum Philosophicum: International Journal for Philosophy 12 (2):313-322..
Intrinsic Vs. Extrinsic Value.Michael J. Zimmerman - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
In Defence of Kantian Humility.Tom McClelland - 2012 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):62-70.
Retribution and Organic Unities.Michael Clark - 2006 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 3 (3):351-358.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2012-08-10

Total views
61 ( #185,428 of 2,499,401 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #209,699 of 2,499,401 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes