Authors
Jonathan Mitchell
Cardiff University
Abstract
This paper assesses whether Evaluativism, as a view about the nature of unpleasant pains, can meet a specific normative condition. The normative condition says whatever candidate state is offered as an analysis of unpleasant pain should be intrinsically phenomenally bad for its subject to be in. I first articulate a method reflecting this condition, called the normative contrast method, and then frame Evaluativism in detail. The view is then tested through this method. I show that Evaluativism can explain why cases of evaluative thought, with the same contents as unpleasant pains, are not intrinsically phenomenally bad for their subjects to be in by appeal to intentional modes. However, I argue the appeal to perceptuality, which is central to this response is problematic, and therefore it remains unclear whether Evaluativism, as standardly articulated, can meet the normative condition on unpleasant pains.
Keywords Pain  Unpleasantness  Evaluativism  Perception  Experience  Value
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Reprint years 2019
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DOI 10.1080/0020174x.2018.1562377
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References found in this work BETA

Mind and World.Huw Price & John McDowell - 1994 - Philosophical Books 38 (3):169-181.
What Makes Pains Unpleasant?David Bain - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):69-89.
Why Take Painkillers?David Bain - 2019 - Noûs 53 (2):462-490.
The Distinctive Feeling Theory of Pleasure.Ben Bramble - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):201-217.

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