Free Will and Moral Responsibility: The Trap, the Appreciation of Agency, and the Bubble [Book Review]

The Journal of Ethics 16 (2):211-239 (2012)
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Abstract

In Part I, I reflect in some detail upon the free will problem and about the way its understanding has radically changed. First I outline the four questions that go into making the free will problem. Second, I consider four paradigmatic shifts that have occurred in our understanding of this problem. Then I go on to reflect upon this complex and multi-level situation. In Part II of this essay, I explore the major alternative positions, and defend my views, in new ways. Instead of trying to spread over many issues, I present one new argument against compatibilism, which I call “The Trap”. This tries to explicate the main problem that I find with this position. Then I present an exposition of what we nevertheless need to follow, which I call “the Appreciation of Agency”. This supports a measure of compatibilism in a more modest form, and opposes hard determinism. On this basis, we can confront the philosophical and practical questions, as to what we ought to believe and how we ought to live, with respect to free will and moral responsibility. This leads to what I call “The Bubble,” which addresses the way in which we deal with the tension between the absence of libertarian free will and The Trap, and the crucial need for the Appreciation of Agency. I conclude by reflecting upon three attributes of the free will problem that I consider central, but that have been neglected in the debate: complexity, risk and tragedy

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Saul Smilansky
University of Haifa

Citations of this work

Blocking Blockage.Ken Levy - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (2):565-583.
Blocking Blockage.Ken Levy - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (2):565-582.
Rescuing Responsibility – and Freedom. A Compatibilist Treatment.Curran F. Douglass - forthcoming - Symposion. Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences.

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References found in this work

Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 1962 - Proceedings of the British Academy 48:187-211.
Ethics and the limits of philosophy.Bernard Williams - 1985 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
An Essay on Free Will.Peter Van Inwagen - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments.R. Jay Wallace - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
The Significance of Free Will.Robert Kane - 1996 - New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.

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