Oxford University Press (1983)

Peter Van Inwagen
University of Notre Dame
"This is an important book, and no one interested in issues which touch on the free will will want to ignore it."--Ethics. In this stimulating and thought-provoking book, the author defends the thesis that free will is incompatible with determinism. He disputes the view that determinism is necessary for moral responsbility. Finding no good reason for accepting determinism, but believing moral responsiblity to be indubitable, he concludes that determinism should be rejected.
Keywords Compatibilism  Determinism  Ethics  Fatalism  Free Will  Incompatibilism  Responsibility
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Reprint years 1986
Buy this book $15.88 used (61% off)   $33.96 new (17% off)   $40.95 from Amazon    Amazon page
Call number BJ1461.V36 1983
ISBN(s) 0198249241   9780198249245   8198249249   0198246242
DOI 10.2307/2185448
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Free Will and Luck.Alfred R. Mele - 2006 - Oxford University Press.
Verbal Disputes.David J. Chalmers - 2011 - Philosophical Review 120 (4):515-566.

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