Abstract

This dissertation attempts to recast the debate over the philosophical problem of the freedom of the will. Most accounts of compatibilism assume that free will is a necessary condition for moral responsibility and then argument is given to the effect that free will is compatible with determinism. An alternative to this strategy is to concede the freedom of the will to the incompatibilists but argue that free will is not a condition of moral responsibility; call this position "modified compatibilism". ;I assess a few modified compatibilist arguments in circulation and conclude that though these arguments provide a prima facie case for the modified compatibilist position, they are indecisive; there are competing intuitions within our moral understanding that seem to support the demand for a free will. I then argue that these competing intuitions must be adjudicated by appeal to a moral theory which sheds some light on the issue. I maintain that P. F. Strawson takes such an approach in "Freedom and Resentment" and that he commits himself to a modified compatibilist position. ;Although I believe that Strawson's strategy is the correct one, I also criticize him for basing his argument on appeal to primarily non-cognitivist insights. I raise some questions about whether his arguments would be successful in the light of a cognitivist moral theory. By drawing on David Wiggins' cognitive underdeterminationist position I set out a cognitivist position which has some claim to success. I argue that Wiggins has the correct kind of metaphysical foundation for his inquiry into value theory. By drawing on Wiggins' position, I try to show that similar Strawsonian arguments can go through and that, therefore, by examining the nature of ethical judgment, it can be shown that free will is not a necessary condition of moral responsibility. I conclude by suggesting some ways in which our moral practices might stand in need of revision if we were to come to see persons as responsible agents but yet as lacking the kind of autonomy which free will is alleged to offer.