Joint Motor Action and Cross-Creature Embodiment

Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (2):279-301 (2011)
  Copy   BIBTEX


The question of what is shared in joint action has been discussed mainly with reference to the notion of collective intentionality. The problem of how to account for intentional states that are shared between two or more jointly engaged creatures is particularly relevant for actions that involve distal intentions. Yet there is another important kind of joint action, which so far has received less interest, at least by philosophers. This kind of action can be described in terms of a shared motor engagement of two or more creatures with their surroundings. In this paper, I address the question of what is shared in such motor engagements. I suggest that joint motor actions come off through sharing particular kinds of feelings. In order to flesh out what it means to share feelings, I introduce the notion of ‘cross-creature embodiment’—the idea that a certain type of embodied mental event is constitutively tied to the body state of another, perceptually present creature in broadly the same way in which it is tied to the experiencing creature’s own. I end by suggesting that this notion makes available a new, albeit tentative, interpretation of recent neuroscientific evidence

Similar books and articles

Joint attention in joint action.Anika Fiebich & Shaun Gallagher - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (4):571-87.
Let’s pretend!: Children and joint action.Deborah Tollefsen - 2005 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 35 (1):75-97.
Why We Did It: An Anscombian Account of Collective Action.Axel Seemann - 2009 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 17 (5):637-655.
Joint Agency: Intersubjectivity, Sense of Control, and the Feeling of Trust.Axel Seemann - 2009 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 52 (5):500-515.
Naturalizing joint action: A process-based approach.Deborah Tollefsen & Rick Dale - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (3):385-407.
The Other Person in Joint Attention: A Relational Approach.Axel Seemann - 2010 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (5-6):161-182.
Intention and Motor Representation in Purposive Action.Stephen Andrew Butterfill & Corrado Sinigaglia - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):119-145.
We-intentions revisited.Raimo Tuomela - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 125 (3):327 - 369.


Added to PP

232 (#70,861)

6 months
58 (#53,279)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Citations of this work

Add more citations

References found in this work

Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Action in Perception.Alva Noë - 2005 - MIT Press.
Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
How the Body Shapes the Mind.Shaun Gallagher - 2005 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
Reference and Consciousness.John Campbell - 2002 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.

View all 41 references / Add more references