Joint Agency: Intersubjectivity, Sense of Control, and the Feeling of Trust

Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 52 (5):500-515 (2009)
  Copy   BIBTEX


In this paper, I am going to be concerned with the capacity of human beings to act jointly. In particular, I will focus on the phenomenal aspect of collective action. I shall suggest that the experience of being jointly engaged with another is complex: it comprises both a practical grasp of oneself and of the other person as single agents participating in the joint pursuit, and an experience of collective immersion in the activity, which includes a sense of joint control. This suggestion gives rise to a number of puzzles: firstly, what is the relation between jointly engaged agents' awareness of self and other and their sense of a joint engagement? Secondly, how are we to substantiate the idea of a sense of joint control if it is also obviously true that I don't, however close our psychological and bodily attunements, have control over your doings? I shall argue that a satisfactory solution to these puzzles is possible only if we take seriously the notion of a perceptually constituted “intersubjective perspective” that is shared by the participants in joint activities and gives rise to an attitude of mutual trust.



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,102

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Joint intention, we-mode and I-mode.Raimo Tuomela - 2006 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 30 (1):35–58.
The Other Person in Joint Attention: A Relational Approach.Axel Seemann - 2010 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (5-6):161-182.
The Sense of Control and the Sense of Agency.Elisabeth Pacherie - 2007 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 13:1 - 30.
The Role of Joint Experience in Historical Narratives.Axel Seemann - 2011 - Journal of the Philosophy of History 5 (2):201-229.
Joint Motor Action and Cross-Creature Embodiment.Axel Seemann - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (2):279-301.
Let’s pretend!: Children and joint action.Deborah Tollefsen - 2005 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 35 (1):75-97.


Added to PP

64 (#234,460)

6 months
3 (#550,572)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

References found in this work

Actions, Reasons, and Causes.Donald Davidson - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685.
Trust and antitrust.Annette Baier - 1986 - Ethics 96 (2):231-260.
Individuals.P. F. Strawson - 1959 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 14 (2):246-246.
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics.James Cargile - 1959 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 38 (2):320-323.

View all 17 references / Add more references