Synthese 105 (3):319 - 345 (1995)

Authors
Gabriel Sandu
University of Helsinki
Abstract
The paper argues that there are two main kinds of joint action, direct joint bringing about (or performing) something (expressed in terms of a DO-operator) and jointly seeing to it that something is the case (expressed in terms of a Stit-operator). The former kind of joint action contains conjunctive, disjunctive and sequential action and its central subkinds. While joint seeing to it that something is the case is argued to be necessarily intentional, direct joint performance can also be nonintentional. Actions performed by social groups are analyzed in terms of the notions of joint action (basically DO and Stit).A precise semantical analysis of the aforementioned kinds of joint action is given in terms of time-trees. With each participant a tree is connected, and the trees are joined defining joint possible worlds in terms of state-expressing nodes from the trees. Sentences containing DO and Stit are semantically evaluated with respect to such joint possible worlds. Intentional joint actions are characterized in terms of the notion of we-intention (joint intention), characterized formally by means of a special operator.
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DOI 10.1007/BF01063562
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References found in this work BETA

Intention is Choice with Commitment.Philip R. Cohen & Hector J. Levesque - 1990 - Artificial Intelligence 42 (2-3):213-261.
Human Action and its Explanation.Raimo Tuomela - 1974 - Institute of Philosophy, University of Helsinki].
We Will Do It: An Analysis of Group-Intentions.Raimo Tuomela - 1991 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (2):249-277.

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Citations of this work BETA

Joint Intention, We-Mode and I-Mode.Raimo Tuomela - 2006 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 30 (1):35–58.
Pragmatic Rationality and Rules.Edward F. Mcclennen - 1997 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 26 (3):210-258.
Searle on Social Institutions: A Critique.Wolfgang Balzer - 2002 - Dialectica 56 (3):195–211.

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