The ArgumentI argue that “social epistemology” can be usefully reformulated as a philosophy of science accounting, specifically one that fosters a critical form of instrumental rationality. I begin by observing that philosophical and sociological species of “science accountancy” can be compared along two dimensions; constructive versus deconstve; reflexive versus unreflexive. The social epistemologist proposes a constructive and reflixive accounting for science. This possibility has been obscured, probably because of the persuasiveness of the Frankfulrt School's portrayal of (...) “critical” and “instrumental” rationalities as polar opposites. In challenging this polarity, I present four “acciybtability conditions” that define pure critico-instrumental rationality. These conditions are most likely to be met during a period of“crisis” in the future direction of science. The bulk of the paper concerns case study of such a crisis that enables us to examine contrasting ways of meeting the four conditions. Ernst Mach and Max Planck debated“the end of science” in the first decade of this century, a time marked by both science's increasing involvement in the means of social reproduction and prowing concern that science pursued for its own sake was exhibiting diminishing margianl returns on investment. In analyzing Planck's victory, I conclude that its tegacy has been an ever-widenig gap between the“content” and“function” of scientific knowledge in society, as measured by the increasing numbers of jobs that are devoted to mediating the production and distribution of knowledge. (shrink)

Summary In Japan, the demand for the philosophy of science has recently increased, and in the last decade many changes have been brought about, among which the most remarkable is the rise of analytic philosophy.

This book contains a selection of original conference papers covering all major fields in the philosophy of science, that have been organized into themes.

Philosophy of Science, understood as a special philosophical discipline, was born only at the beginning of the twentieth century as part of the effort for overcoming the “foundational crisis” that had affected especially mathematics and physics. Therefore, it was conceived as an investigation about the features and reliability of scientific knowledge and for a few decades was deeply marked by the philosophical approach of logical empiricism. This cognitive point of view persisted also when, after Kuhn’s work, the attention (...) focused on the scientific activity in order to understand scientific change and a sociological model replaced the view that empirical adequacy and logical consistency are the factors that determine the change of scientific theories. Ethical, social and political considerations regarding science ware considered inappropriate and potentially dangerous since they violate the alleged “neutrality of science” with respect to values. Nevertheless, the strict intertwining of science and technology in contemporary “technoscience” has produced a wide debate regarding the practical aspect of technoscientific activity that has the intrinsic features of a philosophical debate. Therefore, it is natural and advisable that the entire wealth of the philosophical disciplines be called to contribute to the specific complex discourse of the Philosophy of Science. (shrink)

Excerpt from Cultures and Institutions of Natural History: Essays in the History and Philosophy of Science This volume consists mainly of papers delivered at two meetings cosponsored by the Museo Civico di Storia Naturale in Milan and the California Academy of Sciences in San Francisco. The first, on the Culture of Natural History, was held in Milan, November l4-l 6, I996. The second, on Institutions of Natural History, was held in San Francisco, October 5 - 7, 1998. They (...) followed two earlier conferences on Biology as History (pinna and Ghiselin I996; Ghiselin and Pinna I996) likewise held in Milan and San Francisco. We intend to continue the series of meetings and have publications based on them in commemoration of the Academy's sesquicentennial in 2003. The emphasis here is mainly upon natural history museums and the kind of science that goes on in them. Although the essays were originally written to stand by themselves, when arranged in chronological order they suggest a common theme. To paraphrase Darwin, the culture and institutions of natural history have been, and are being, evolved. They have adapted to local circumstances, diversified, and sometimes even progressed. We may hope that the future holds more than just retrogression and extinction in store. Read as case studies the essays provide valuable insights into not just how, but why, the institutions have come into being and subsequently been transformed. Previous generations had quite different ideas than we do about how a collection of naturalia is supposed to function and how it should be organized. And there were con icting goals and serious disputes about policy, much as there are today. Often, though not always, the institutions turn out to be very different from what had been envisioned by their founders. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works.". (shrink)

The “International Congress for the Philosophy of Science” was held in the week of August 23–28, 1954 at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich, Switzerland. The Institute enjoys a very high reputation as one of the foremost schools of its kind in the world. It was at this Institute that Albert Einstein taught at the beginning of his academic career. The Congress was arranged as the Second Congress of the “Union Internationale de Philosophie des Sciences” which (...) has its permanent seat in Paris, France. The first Congress of the U.I.P.S. was held in Paris in 1949. It was then that the “International Forum of Zurich” was asked to organize five years later the Congress of Zurich. (shrink)

Proceedings of the 1978 Pisa, Italy, September 4-8, 1978 Conference on the History and Philosophy of Science.

This textbook describes and explains the fundamentals of applying empirical methods for theory building and theory testing in marketing research. The authors explain the foundations in philosophy of science and the various methodological approaches to readers who are working empirically with the purpose of developing and testing theories in marketing. The primary target group of the book are graduate students and PhD students who are preparing their empirical research projects, e.g. for a master thesis or a dissertation.

Who are the major figures that have shaped philosophy of science in Britain? What impact has the subject had in Britain outside academic philosophy? How have two of the major centers of the subject - in Pittsburgh and in London - interacted over the years? I begin by looking briefly at the recent history of philosophy of science in Britain and its general impact (tying this in with its interaction with the Pittsburgh Center and Pittsburgh (...) people. It seems to me, though, that the best way to celebrate an anniversary like that of the Pittsburgh Center is by predominantly looking forward rather than back. And I concentrate in this lecture on showing how philosophy of science can have an impact on issues of current concern, in Britain and more generally. (shrink)

In this book the author has brought together his long-standing interests in theory of scientific rationality and hermeneutic ontology by developing a hermeneutic alternative to analytic (and naturalist) epistemology of science. The hermeneutic philosophy of science is less the name of a new field of philosophical than a demand for a repetition of the basic philosophical questions of science from hermeneutic point of view. The book addresses chiefly two subjects: (I) The hermeneutic response to the models (...) of rational reconstruction of scientific knowledge; (II) The specificity of hermeneutico-ontological approach to the cognitive pluralism in science. (shrink)

The rise of cognitive science in the last half-century has been accompanied by a considerable amount of philosophical activity. No other area within analytic philosophy in the second half of that period has attracted more attention or produced more publications. Philosophical work relevant to cognitive science has become a sprawling field (extending beyond analytic philosophy) which no one can fully master, although some try and keep abreast of the philosophical literature and of the essential scientific developments. (...) Due to the particular nature of its subject, it touches on a multitude of distinct special branches in philosophy and in science. It has also become quite a difficult, complicated and technical field, to the point of being nearly impenetrable for philosophers or scientists coming from other fields or traditions. Finally, it is contentious: Cognitive science is far from having reached stability, it is still widely regarded with suspicion, philosophers working within its confine have sharp disagreements amongst themselves, and philosophers standing outside, especially (but not only) of non-analytic persuasion, are often inclined to see both cognitive science and its accompanying philosophy as more or less confused or even deeply flawed. The sensible way to go under the circumstances, or so one might judge, would be to pick a sample of salient topics, in the present case, philosophical discussions of some central foundational issues, in the hope thereby of giving the reader a sense of what the field is about. This however is not the path I propose to take. There are two reasons for choosing another tack. The negative reason is that there is now available a plethora of excellent expositions, of any length one might desire, from one-page summaries to chapter- or volume-length introductions, of central topics in philosophy of mind (which constitutes in turn the core of what most philosophers think of as philosophy of cognitive science: more on this in a moment)1.. (shrink)

PORTUGUESE: Neste artigo, apresentaremos uma visão particular do desenvolvimento de teorias científicas que denominamos (inspirados em Ortega y Gasset) "perspectivismo". Discutiremos como, através desse enfoque, é possível compatibilizar diversas descrições aparentemente distintas e incompatíveis de uma suposta realidade que se investiga. Fazemos isso distinguindo entre a "realidade" (R) e a "descrição empírica da realidade" (Re). Aceitando que podemos ter diversas descrições empíricas de uma mesma realidade, discutimos o caso particular em que esse esquema é utilizado nos debates atuais acerca da (...) ontologia da física quântica, em especial da mecânica quântica não relativista. Como se sabe, essa teoria é compatível com distintas ontologias (ou metafísicas), em particular, pode ser vista como comprometida com uma ontologia de indivíduos, mas também com uma ontologia de não indivíduos. Ambas as alternativas são plausíveis e merecem ser desenvolvidas. Propomos que o perspectivismo aqui apresentado é neutro com relação à escolha de uma metafísica (ontologia), bem como aos debates entre realistas e antirrealistas em filosofia da ciência. Concluímos que passar do pluralismo aceito pelo perspectivista ao realismo ou antirrealismo envolve comprometimento com teses mais robustas acerca da relação entre realidade e descrição da realidade.ENGLISH: In this article we present a particular view of the development of scientific theories which (following Ortega y Gasset), we term "perspectivism". Making use of this view, we discuss how we can accommodate distinct and apparently incompatible descriptions of a supposed reality under investigation. We distinguish between a "reality" (R) and its "empirical description", (Re). Acknowledging that we can have diverse empirical descriptions of the same reality, we discuss the particular case in which the view is applied to current debates on the ontology of quantum physics, especially of non-relativistic quantum mechanics. As it is well known, this theory is compatible with treating quantum objects either as individuals or as non-individuals. Both ontologies are possible and deserve to be developed. We propose that the perspectivism developed here is neutral not only with respect to the choice of an ontology, but also concerning the debates among realists and anti-realists in the philosophy of science. We conclude that to go beyond the pluralism accepted by perspectivism, and to adopt realism or anti-realism, involves commitment to strong theses about the relation between reality and its descriptions. PORTUGUESE: Neste artigo, apresentaremos uma visão particular do desenvolvimento de teorias científicas que denominamos (inspirados em Ortega y Gasset) "perspectivismo". Discutiremos como, através desse enfoque, é possível compatibilizar diversas descrições aparentemente distintas e incompatíveis de uma suposta realidade que se investiga. Fazemos isso distinguindo entre a "realidade" (R) e a "descrição empírica da realidade" (Re). Aceitando que podemos ter diversas descrições empíricas de uma mesma realidade, discutimos o caso particular em que esse esquema é utilizado nos debates atuais acerca da ontologia da física quântica, em especial da mecânica quântica não relativista. Como se sabe, essa teoria é compatível com distintas ontologias (ou metafísicas), em particular, pode ser vista como comprometida com uma ontologia de indivíduos, mas também com uma ontologia de não indivíduos. Ambas as alternativas são plausíveis e merecem ser desenvolvidas. Propomos que o perspectivismo aqui apresentado é neutro com relação à escolha de uma metafísica (ontologia), bem como aos debates entre realistas e antirrealistas em filosofia da ciência. Concluímos que passar do pluralismo aceito pelo perspectivista ao realismo ou antirrealismo envolve comprometimento com teses mais robustas acerca da relação entre realidade e descrição da realidade. (shrink)

In this paper I investigate the prospects of integrated history and philosophy of science, by examining how philosophical issues concerning experimental practice and scientific realism can enrich the historical investigation of the careers of "hidden entities", entities that are not accessible to unmediated observation. Conversely, I suggest that the history of those entities has important lessons to teach to the philosophy of science. My overall aim is to illustrate the possibility of a fruitful two-way traffic between (...) history and philosophy of science. (shrink)

The two volumes to which this is apreface consist of the Proceedings of the Second International Conference on History and Philosophy of Science. The Conference was organized by the Joint Commission of the International Union of History and Philosophy of Science under the auspices of the IUHPS, the Italian Society for Logic and Philosophy of Science, and the Domus Galilaeana of Pisa, headed by Professor Vincenzo Cappelletti. Domus Galilaeana also served as the host institution, (...) with some help from the University of Pisa. The Conference took place in Pisa, Italy, on September 4-8, 1978. The editors of these two volumes of the Proceedings of the Pisa Conference acknowledge with gratitude the help by the different sponsoring organizations, and in the first place that by both Divisions of the IUHPS, which made the Conference possible. A special recognition is due to Professor Evandro Agazzi, President of the Italian Society for Logic and Philosophy of Science, who was co opted as an additional member of the Organizing Committee. This committee was otherwise identical with the Joint Commission, whose members were initially John Murdoch, John North, Arpad Szab6, Robert Butts, Jaakko Hintikka, and Vadim Sadovsky. Later, Erwin Hiebert and Lubos Novy were appointed as additional members. (shrink)

Proceedings of the 1978 Pisa, Italy, September 4-8, 1978 Conference on the History and Philosophy of Science.

A philosopher of science examines the biggest ethical and moral issues in science today, and explains why they matter for all of us--scientist and layman alike.

The 14th Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science will be held on July 19-26, 2011, in Nancy, France . In order to provide some historical background about DLMPS Congresses, we are honoured to have the opportunity to reissue a chapter of Anita Burdman Feferman and Solomon Feferman's Alfred Tarski : Life and Logic, dedicated to the early history of the DLMPS and the organization of the first Congress held in 1960 in Stanford. We are very grateful (...) to the authors and the Cambridge University Press for their kind authorization to reissue this text. (shrink)

A view of the Center for Philosophy of Science from an Israeli perspective.

On the basis of a new reading of Gérard Simon’s Kepler astronome astrologue, and by comparing the author’s position with that of Michel Foucault, this article attempts to clarify the relationship between history of science and history of knowledge. -/- .

Examines some of the potential and some of the problems inherent in using computerized simulations in science and science studies classes by applying lessons from the epistemology of science. While computer simulations are useful pedagogical tools, they are not experiments and thus are of only limited utility as substitutes for actual laboratories. Contains 20 references. (Author/PVD).

This article defends methodological and theoretical pluralism in the social sciences. While pluralistic, such a philosophy of social science is both pragmatic and normative. Only by facing the problems of such pluralism, including how to resolve the potential conflicts between various methods and theories, is it possible to discover appropriate criteria of adequacy for social scientific explanations and interpretations. So conceived, the social sciences do not give us fixed and universal features of the social world, but rather contribute (...) to the task of improving upon our practical knowledge of on-going social life. After arguing for such a thorough-going pluralism based on the indeterminacy of social action, I defend it from the post-modern and hermeneutic objections by suggesting the possibility of an epistemology of interpretive social science as a form of practical knowledge. (shrink)

Lacan critiqued imaginary intuition for confusing direct perception with unconscious pre-conceptions about people and the world. The emphasis on description goes hand in hand with a rejection of theory and the science of the unconscious and a belief in the naive self-transparency of the world. At the same time, knowing in and of the Real requires a place beyond thinking, multi-valued forms of logic, mathematical equations, and different conceptions of causality, acausality, and chance. This book explores some of the (...) mathematical problems raised by Lacan's use of numbers and the interconnection between mathematics and psychoanalytic ideas. Within any system, mathematical or otherwise, there are holes, or acausal cores and remainders of indecidability. It is this senseless point of non-knowledge that makes change, and the emergence of the new, possible within a system. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to analyze the consequences of R. Rorty’s pragmatic cum linguistic turn for the understanding of natural and human sciences. The author analyzes first this turn and tries to show that it represents an intersubjectivist type of antirealism. Then he deals with Rorty’s approach to hermeneutics and his understanding of its place in natural and human sciences. Finally, he discusses the consequences of Rorty’s intersubjectivist antirealism for human sciences and tries to show that, on one (...) hand, it represents the philosophical basis of the so-called idea-lism of interpretative human science and on the other hand, it enables us to see the latter’s foundations from a new, fresh perspective. (shrink)

The two volumes to which this is apreface consist of the Proceedings of the Second International Conference on History and Philosophy of Science. The Conference was organized by the Joint Commission of the International Union of History and Philosophy of Science (IUHPS) under the auspices of the IUHPS, the Italian Society for Logic and Philosophy of Science, and the Domus Galilaeana of Pisa, headed by Professor Vincenzo Cappelletti. Domus Galilaeana also served as the host (...) institution, with some help from the University of Pisa. The Conference took place in Pisa, Italy, on September 4-8, 1978. The editors of these two volumes of the Proceedings of the Pisa Conference acknowledge with gratitude the help by the different sponsoring organizations, and in the first place that by both Divisions of the IUHPS, which made the Conference possible. A special recognition is due to Professor Evandro Agazzi, President of the Italian Society for Logic and Philosophy of Science, who was co opted as an additional member of the Organizing Committee. This committee was otherwise identical with the Joint Commission, whose members were initially John Murdoch, John North, Arpad Szab6, Robert Butts, Jaakko Hintikka, and Vadim Sadovsky. Later, Erwin Hiebert and Lubos Novy were appointed as additional members. (shrink)

In the first third of this century Cassirer was one of the leading, most influential philosophers of the German-speaking world. He was the respected opponent of such giants as Husserl, Russell, Schlick, Heidegger or Carnap who left their mark on the philosophical landscape until this very day. One might recall his discussion with Schlick on the philosophical relevance of Einstein’s relativity theory in the first decade of this century. Carnap reported to have received essential ideas for the Logical Construction of (...) the World from Cassirer and other neo-Kantians; or, to recall a more spectacular event concerning Cassirer’s philosophy, one might mention the famous “Davos disputation” with Heidegger in 1929 which seems to have been a major philosophical event for the audience. (shrink)

This volume concerns philosophical issues that arise from the practice of anthropology and sociology. The essays cover a wide range of issues, including traditional questions in the philosophy of social science as well as those specific to these disciplines. Authors attend to the historical development of the current debates and set the stage for future work.

The authors discuss concepts of health and disease in Chinese medicine, new interpretative techniques in psychotherapy, concepts of culture and the notion of risk, Brecht's and Wallner's Verfremdung and Wallner's Constructive Realism compared to Glasersfeld's Radical Constructivism. The book shows the rare situation of philosophy becoming concrete.

This book, written by one of the leading Japanese scholars in the philosophy of agricultural science, examines the relationship between human life, the natural environment, and agriculture.