Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):119-145 (2014)
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Abstract |
Are there distinct roles for intention and motor representation in explaining the purposiveness of action? Standard accounts of action assign a role to intention but are silent on motor representation. The temptation is to suppose that nothing need be said here because motor representation is either only an enabling condition for purposive action or else merely a variety of intention. This paper provides reasons for resisting that temptation. Some motor representations, like intentions, coordinate actions in virtue of representing outcomes; but, unlike intentions, motor representations cannot feature as premises or conclusions in practical reasoning. This implies that motor representation has a distinctive role in explaining the purposiveness of action. It also gives rise to a problem: were the roles of intention and motor representation entirely independent, this would impair effective action. It is therefore necessary to explain how intentions interlock with motor representations. The solution, we argue, is to recognise that the contents of intentions can be partially determined by the contents of motor representations. Understanding this content-determining relation enables better understanding how intentions relate to actions
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Keywords | action intention motor representation demonstrative thought |
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ISBN(s) | 0031-8205 |
DOI | 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2012.00604.x |
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References found in this work BETA
Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
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Citations of this work BETA
Intentions and Motor Representations: The Interface Challenge.Myrto Mylopoulos & Elisabeth Pacherie - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (2):317-336.
Skilled Action and the Double Life of Intention.Joshua Shepherd - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (2):286-305.
Beyond Automaticity: The Psychological Complexity of Skill.Elisabeth Pacherie & Myrto Mylopoulos - 2020 - Topoi 40 (3):649-662.
Embodied Savoir-Faire: Knowledge-How Requires Motor Representations.Neil Levy - 2017 - Synthese 194 (2).
View all 96 citations / Add more citations
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