Abstract

The article focuses on the concept of sense in Husserl’s phenomenology. The author points to the presence of different interpretations of “sense” in phenomenology, and dwells in detail on the one that is consonant with the theme of this panel discussion. In this regard, the author refers to the introduction of the concept of sense as the core of the noema in the first book of “Ideas for Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy”. In accordance with the chosen interpretation strategy sense denotes an ob­ject considered in a phenomenological attitude, that is, an object from the point of view of its givenenness of consciousness. This means that the meaning and the subject mean­ingfully sense the same thing. From a phenomenological point of view, to perceive objec­tively means to perceive meaningfully. The article highlights the features of this concept of sense, which primarily include integrity and correlation with the content that already exists in consciousness. The author pays special attention to the fact that sense, as an ob­jective integrity, can be understood not only material things, but also relationships, pro­cesses, states of affairs, etc. The task of phenomenology is to fix the sense, their justifica­tion and research. This research can be carried out within the framework of a theoretical cognitive approach, where the identification of the conditions for the possibility of sense as knowledge and the determination of their truth come to the fore.