Logic isn’t normative

Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (3-4):371-388 (2020)
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Abstract

Some writers object to logical pluralism on the grounds that logic is normative. The rough idea is that the relation of logical consequence has consequences for what we ought to think and h...

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Gillian Russell
University of St. Andrews

References found in this work

Logical Pluralism.Jc Beall & Greg Restall - 2005 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Edited by Greg Restall.
Logical pluralism.Jc Beall & Greg Restall - 2000 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (4):475 – 493.
How to derive "ought" from "is".John R. Searle - 1964 - Philosophical Review 73 (1):43-58.
Doubt Truth to Be a Liar.Graham Priest - 2007 - Studia Logica 87 (1):129-134.

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