The normative problem for logical pluralism

Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (3-4):258-281 (2020)
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Abstract

It is commonly thought that logic, whatever it may be, is normative. While accounting for the normativity of logic is a challenge for any view of logic, in this paper I argue that it is particularly problematic for certain types of logical pluralists, due to what I call the normative problem for logical pluralism. I introduce the NPLP, distinguish it from other problems that logical pluralists may face, and show that it is unsolvable for one prominent type of logical pluralism.

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Nathan Kellen
Kansas State University

Citations of this work

A simple solution to the collapse argument for logical pluralism.Diego Tajer - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

Change in View: Principles of Reasoning.Gilbert Harman - 1986 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.
Critique of Pure Reason.I. Kant - 1787/1998 - Philosophy 59 (230):555-557.
Logical Pluralism.Jc Beall & Greg Restall - 2005 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Edited by Greg Restall.
Truth as one and many.Michael P. Lynch - 2009 - New York : Clarendon Press,: Clarendon Press.
The Frege reader.Gottlob Frege & Michael Beaney (eds.) - 1997 - Cambridge: Blackwell.

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