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Nathan Kellen
Owensboro Community & Technical College
  1.  46
    The Normative Problem for Logical Pluralism.Nathan Kellen - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (3-4):258-281.
    It is commonly thought that logic, whatever it may be, is normative. While accounting for the normativity of logic is a challenge for any view of logic, in this paper I argue that it is particularly problematic for certain types of logical pluralists, due to what I call the normative problem for logical pluralism. I introduce the NPLP, distinguish it from other problems that logical pluralists may face, and show that it is unsolvable for one prominent type of logical pluralism.
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  2.  61
    Pluralisms in Truth and Logic.Jeremy Wyatt, Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Nathan Kellen (eds.) - 2018 - Cham, Switzerland and Basingstoke, Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
    This edited volume brings together 18 state-of-the art essays on pluralism about truth and logic. Parts I and II are dedicated to respectively truth pluralism and logical pluralism, and Part III to their interconnections. Some contributors challenge pluralism, arguing that the nature of truth or logic is uniform. The majority of contributors, however, defend pluralism, articulate novel versions of the view, or contribute to fundamental debates internal to the pluralist camp. The volume will be of interest to truth theorists and (...)
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    Methodological Pluralism About Truth.Nathan Kellen - 2018 - In Jeremy Wyatt, Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen & Nathan Kellen (eds.), Pluralisms in Truth and Logic. pp. 131-144.
    In this paper I argue that contemporary truth pluralists have undersold the connection between their views and the semantic realism/anti-realism debate. I argue that pluralist theories of truth are essentially a combination of accepting both realist and anti-realist intuitions, and that we should take this lesson to heart. I show how we can categorize pluralist views by how realist or anti-realist they are, and introduce two notions to do so: methodological fundamentality and theoretical fundamentality. I show how viewing the pluralist (...)
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  4. The Nature of Truth (Second Edition).Michael Lynch, Jeremy Wyatt, Junyeol Kim & Nathan Kellen (eds.) - 2021 - Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.