Logic and Logical Philosophy:1-26 (forthcoming)

Camillo Fiore
Universidad de Buenos Aires (UBA)
Logical pluralism is a general idea that there is more than one correct logic. Carnielli and Rodrigues [2019a] defend an epistemic interpretation of the paraconsistent logic N4, according to which an argument is valid in this logic just in case it necessarily preserves evidence. The authors appeal to this epistemic interpretation to briefly motivate a kind of logical pluralism: “different accounts of logical consequence may preserve different properties of propositions”. The aim of this paper is to study the prospect of a logical pluralism based on different interpretations of logical systems. First, we give our analysis of what it means to interpret a logic – and make some hopefully useful distinctions along the way. Second, we present what we call an interpretational logical pluralism: there is more than one correct logic and a logic is correct only if it has some adequate interpretation. We consider four variants of this idea, bring up some possible objections, and try to find plausible solutions on behalf of the pluralist. We will argue that interpretations of logical systems provide a promising – albeit not unproblematic – route to logical pluralism.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.12775/llp.2022.007
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 71,316
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Inquiry.Robert C. Stalnaker - 1984 - Cambridge University Press.
Doubt Truth to Be a Liar.Graham Priest - 2005 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Anti-Exceptionalism About Logic.Ole Thomassen Hjortland - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (3):631-658.
Logic Isn’T Normative.Gillian Russell - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (3-4):371-388.
Logical Pluralism.Jc Beall & Greg Restall - 2000 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (4):475 – 493.

View all 30 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Beyond Logical Pluralism and Logical Monism.Pavel Arazim - 2020 - Logica Universalis 14 (2):151-174.
Limiting Logical Pluralism.Suki Finn - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 20):4905-4923.
Rivalry, Normativity, and the Collapse of Logical Pluralism.Erik Stei - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (3-4):411-432.
Logical Pluralism, Indeterminacy and the Normativity of Logic.Filippo Ferrari & Sebastiano Moruzzi - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-24.
Why Logical Pluralism?Colin R. Caret - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 20):4947-4968.
Logical Pluralism and Semantic Information.Patrick Allo - 2007 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 36 (6):659 - 694.


Added to PP index

Total views
15 ( #700,860 of 2,519,441 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
15 ( #52,858 of 2,519,441 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes