Informatique affective: L’utilisation des systèmes de reconnaissance des émotions est-elle en cohérence avec la justice sociale?

Dissertation, Université Laval (2019)
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Abstract

Emotion recognition systems (ERS) offer the ability to identify the emotions of others, based on an analysis of their facial expressions and regardless of culture, ethnicity, context, gender or social class. By claiming universalism in the expression as well as in the recognition of emotions, we believe that ERS present significant risks of causing great harm to some individuals, in addition to targeting, in some contexts, specific social groups. Drawing on a wide range of multidisciplinary knowledge - including philosophy, psychology, computer science and anthropology - this research project aims to identify the current limitations of ERS and the main risks that their use brings, with the goal of providing a clear and robust analysis of the use of ERS and their contribution to greater social justice. Pointing to technical limitations, we refute, on the one hand, the idea that ERS are able to prove the causal link between specific emotions and specific facial expressions. We support our argument with evidence of the inability of ERS to distinguish facial expressions of emotions from facial expressions as communication signals. On the other hand, due to the contextual and cultural limitations of current ERS, we refute the idea that ERS are able to recognise, with equal performance, the emotions of individuals, regardless of their culture, ethnicity, gender and social class. Our ethical analysis shows that the risks are considerably more numerous and important than the benefits that could be derived from using ERS. However, we have separated out a specific type of ERS, whose use is limited to the field of care, and which shows a remarkable potential to actively participate in social justice, not only by complying with the minimum requirements, but also by meeting the criterion of beneficence. While ERS currently pose significant risks, it is possible to consider the potential for specific types to participate in social justice and provide emotional and psychological support and assistance to certain members of society.

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Alexandra Prégent
Leiden University

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