Vasil Penchev
Bulgarian Academy of Sciences
A principle, according to which any scientific theory can be mathematized, is investigated. That theory is presupposed to be a consistent text, which can be exhaustedly represented by a certain mathematical structure constructively. In thus used, the term “theory” includes all hypotheses as yet unconfirmed as already rejected. The investigation of the sketch of a possible proof of the principle demonstrates that it should be accepted rather a metamathematical axiom about the relation of mathematics and reality. Its investigation needs philosophical means. Husserl’s phenomenology is what is used, and then the conception of “bracketing reality” is modelled to generalize Peano arithmetic in its relation to set theory in the foundation of mathematics. The obtained model is equivalent to the generalization of Peano arithmetic by means of replacing the axiom of induction with that of transfinite induction. A comparison to Mach’s doctrine is used to be revealed the fundamental and philosophical reductionism of Husserl’s phenomenology leading to a kind of Pythagoreanism in the final analysis. Accepting or rejecting the principle, two kinds of mathematics appear differing from each other by its relation to reality. Accepting the principle, mathematics has to include reality within itself in a kind of Pythagoreanism. These two kinds are called in paper correspondingly Hilbert mathematics and Gödel mathematics. The sketch of the proof of the principle demonstrates that the generalization of Peano arithmetic as above can be interpreted as a model of Hilbert mathematics into Gödel mathematics therefore showing that the former is not less consistent than the latter, and the principle is an independent axiom. An information interpretation of Hilbert mathematics is involved. It is a kind of ontology of information. Thus the problem which of the two mathematics is more relevant to our being is discussed. An information interpretation of the Schrödinger equation is involved to illustrate the above problem.
Keywords axiom of choice  axiom of induction  axiom of transfinite induction  eidetic, phenomenological and transcendental reduction  epoché  Gödel mathematics and Hilbert mathematics  information and quantum information  axiom of choice   axiom of induction   axiom of transfinite induction   eidetic, phenomenological and transcendental reduction   epoché   Gödel mathematics   Hilbert mathprinciple of universal mathematizability
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Aufsätze Und Vorträge.Edmund Husserl - 1987 - Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
Heidegger and the Phenomenological Reduction.Francis F. Seeburger - 1975 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 36 (2):212-221.
Intention.[author unknown] - 1960 - Philosophical Quarterly 10 (40):281-282.
Classified.[author unknown] - 1977 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 50 (5):436-436.

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