Hilbert between the formal and the informal side of mathematics

Manuscrito 38 (2):5-38 (2015)
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Abstract

: In this article we analyze the key concept of Hilbert's axiomatic method, namely that of axiom. We will find two different concepts: the first one from the period of Hilbert's foundation of geometry and the second one at the time of the development of his proof theory. Both conceptions are linked to two different notions of intuition and show how Hilbert's ideas are far from a purely formalist conception of mathematics. The principal thesis of this article is that one of the main problems that Hilbert encountered in his foundational studies consisted in securing a link between formalization and intuition. We will also analyze a related problem, that we will call "Frege's Problem", form the time of the foundation of geometry and investigate the role of the Axiom of Completeness in its solution.

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Giorgio Venturi
University of Campinas

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