Journal of Scottish Philosophy 13 (3):265-278 (2015)

Authors
Katharina Paxman
Brigham Young University
Abstract
Hume's explanation of our tendency to confuse calm passions with reason due to lack of feeling appears to present a tension with his claim that we cannot be mistaken about our own impressions. I argue that the calm/violent distinction cannot be understood in terms of presence/absence of feeling. Rather, for Hume the presence or absence of disruption and disordering of natural and/or customary modes of thought is the key distinction between the calm and violent passions. This reading provides new explanations of our confusion of calm passions with reason, and the potential for calm passions to prevail over violent.
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DOI 10.3366/jsp.2015.0108
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References found in this work BETA

Hume.Barry Stroud - 1977 - Routledge.
An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections.Francis Hutcheson - 1742 - Gainesville, Fla., Scholars' Facsimiles & Reprints.

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Citations of this work BETA

Hume and the Guise of the Bad.Francesco Orsi - 2020 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 18 (1):39-56.

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