Abstract

In this dissertation, I examine David Hume's account of the moral sentiments, and their relation to moral evaluation. Chapters I and II contain a preliminary discussion of Hume's epistemology, his thesis that moral evaluations are not the products of reason alone, and his account of the relationship between the moral sentiments and moral evaluation. Special attention is given to the apparent conflict between those passages in Book III, Part I of the Treatise in which Hume appears to hold that moral evaluations are identical to actual, occurrent moral sentiments and those passages in Book III, Part III of the Treatise in which he appears to hold that moral evaluations are judgments or beliefs about the moral sentiments one would have in certain circumstances. ;Chapters III and IV are devoted to an examination of the relationship between the passions and the moral sentiments. In these chapters, I defend three theses. First, the moral sentiments are distinct from the feelings of approbation and disapprobation. Second, even though Hume seems to hold that approbation and disapprobation are indirect passions, the moral sentiments are neither direct nor indirect passions. Finally, the moral sentiments are not calm passions. Hume's distinction between the calm and violent passions is not the same as his distinction between the calm and violent impressions of reflection. I argue that the calm impressions of reflection, which include the moral and aesthetic sentiments, are not passions at all. ;Chapter V contains an examination of Hume's account of sympathy and the role it plays in the production of the moral sentiments. Chapter VI contains an attempt to clarify Hume's notion of the general point of view and a re-examination of those passages in Book III, Part III of the Treatise where Hume appears to abandon the view that moral evaluations are identical to actual, occurrent moral sentiments. I show that the standard interpretation of these passages is based on the false assumption that the moral sentiments are passions. Hume is not abandoning his original theory in these passages. He is only claiming that moral evaluations do not always affect the passions