In this discussion I shall argue that some fairly widely held views about human habits are mistaken. These misconceptions are important because of the pervasiveness of the habitual in human behavior and because it is the concept of habit that has served as the prototype of various conceptions of conditioned response which are used in psychological explanation. One major task of this analysis is to show that accounts in which actions are explained by reference to rules are not incompatible with (...) accounts in which the same behavior is seen as the product of habit. (shrink)

In an examination of Ryle's distinction between knowing how and knowing that D. G. Brown is led to the conclusion that “All knowing how is knowing that.” The distinction is improper, and these tags should be dropped. All knowledge is propositional, after all, though there is a legitimate way of retaining the essentials of Ryle's account. Knowledge for which the primary evidence is a person's performance replaces the category of knowing how in this reformulated version of the distinction. But to (...) have this type of knowledge is to know the answers to questions concerning the way in which it can be done. And this is knowing that. (shrink)

Hume is famous for the view that "reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions." His claim that "we are no sooner acquainted with the impossibility of satisfying any desire, than the desire itself vanishes" is less well known. Each seems, in opposite ways, shocking to common sense. This paper explores the latter claim, looking for its source in Hume's account of the passions and exploring its compatibility with his associationist psychology. We are led to the (...) conclusion that this view—that desires vanish when fulfilment is deemed impossible—endows reason with a power over the passions that is at odds with its role as slave, and ultimately incompatible with a proper understanding of emotions such as grief. Such emotions involve continuing to want what one believes to be impossible. The human (and Humean) imagination can sustain desires without the belief that fulfilment is possible. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:59. HUME'S DEBT TO KANT Various commentators on Hume's work have argued that his examination of our causal reasoning is not fundamentally at odds with the claims made by Kant in his supposed "answer to Hume". One way of making the connection, suggested by Wolff for example, is to emphasize the ways in which Humean epistemology depends upon a theory of mental activity. If this activity itself can only (...) be understood in terms of built-in "propensities" of the mind, these dispositions can be interpreted as psychological descriptions of a mind operating in accordance with something quite like Kantian categories. Another way of arguing for this compatibility between Hume and Kant is to bring out central principles (e.g., relating to causation ) which Hume's account depends upon, but which are such that they cannot be given an experiential foundation. Lewis White Beck has offered such a Kantianization of Hume, arguing that beneath the surface of the official Empiricist Hume (and just outside Hume's view of what he was doing) there is a commitment to principles that have 2 an a priori status in his theory. If Beck is right about this, we might speak with tongue only partially in cheek, of Hume's debt to Kant, for the Kantian categories could be taken as the systematic working out of the underpinnings of Hume's theory. In this paper I shall consider this problem only insofar as it relates to causal reasoning. I focus on Professor Wilson's defense of the Empiricist Hume, in which it is denied that our causal reasoning rests upon a priori principles. The principles in question are that (1) Every event has some cause, and (2) That like causes have like effects, and like effects like causes. Wilson argues that these are both empirical generalizations within an account that is both plausible and Humean. I shall 60. argue briefly that, contrary to Wilson's claim, the Humean account of causation makes the second of these an a priori truth because it is analytic. The first is certainly not an analytic truth, but it could not have been derived from experience, at least as Hume depicts our experience. It thus seems to be a claim that is functioning as synthetic and a priori in Hume's account of our beliefs. Except in the general way that this phrase implies, this paper is not really about Kant, who will barely be mentioned again. In my discussion of Wilson's argument I will not deal with the formalizations which he has introduced, but will attempt to capture the main lines of argument in more or less ordinary language. In proceeding thus, I am siding with Hume in siding with the vulgar. Having listed the eight rules of causal judgment which are under discussion here, Hume says Here is all the LOGIC I think proper to employ in my reasoning; and perhaps even this was not very necessary, but might have been supply 'd by the natural principles of our understanding. Our scholastic headpieces and logicians shew no such superiority above the mere vulgar in their reason and ability, as to give us an inclination to imitate them in delivering a long system of rules and precepts to direct our judgment, in philosophy. (T175) 1. The basic problem is whether or not Hume's explanation of our causal reasoning depends upon the assumption that all events have causes, and depends upon it in a way that makes this assumption a priori. Beck (and Wolff) have argued that this is the case, and hence that Hume is much closer to Kant than is commonly supposed. This Wilson denies. The argument revolves around the cases in which we fail to observe the causes we have come to associate with certain effects (or, in principle, vice versa) so that the conjunction of events is not "constant". The Humean account of what happens in such circumstances is that the imagination supplies the deficiency; we feign unobserved events to 4 fill the gap. But whereas Hume frequently disparages such 61. exercises of the fancy (as he calls them) he does not do so here. Hence, one may ask, what entitles us... (shrink)

This paper focuses on Quebec language legislation which has the effect of prohibiting the use of the use of English on signs. The controversial “Frenchonly” sign law is considered in spelling out an argument for collective rights and assessing some of the obstacles which a collective rights thesis must overcome. No attempt is made in this discussion to resolve the question of the relative weight of the collective and individual rights which come into conflict in this situation. No doubt this (...) latter is itself a difficult task. If the argument of this paper is sound, however, a solution phrased wholly in terms of individual rights and the public good is simpler only because it omits important dimensions of the problem. (shrink)

In the Principles of Philosophy the first positive claim that Descartes makes after he has established his skeptical starting point is not the claim of the cogito. It is, rather, the claim that “we possess a free will.”.

This essay is an attempt to restore Hume’s account of personal identity to its place in the treatise and to show that it becomes far more plausible in that setting. In this chapter Hume undertakes the tasks of showing how the mistaken idea of a substantial self arises and providing a model for re-thinking the question and eliminating the mistake. It is argued that Hume does not end up dealing with a false question (as some have claimed), and that this (...) theory of mental identity survives the criticisms of its author. (shrink)

In this paper I shall consider Hume's claim that it is in vain to ask “Whether there be body or not?’ I have often been puzzled by this interesting remark; puzzled as to just what he meant by it, why he said it, and whether he was right. I don't expect to do any more than explore some of the possibilities and suggest some tentative answers in this discussion. Hume seems to have argued that we can't take this question seriously (...) because we could never sincerely believe what we said if we denied that “body” exists; and that we can't have any genuine doubt on this head because “certain trivial qualities of the fancy” lead us inevitably into a “gross illusion”. We are thus stuck having to believe what we can prove to be false. Reason mocks us like a palsied hand, knocking away precisely what it tries hardest to grasp. This, I say, is what Hume seems to have argued. But let's see what else we can do with his words. I shall begin by giving a brief account of this belief in “body”. I shall then explore some senses in which the question of the existence of body might turn out to be vain. (shrink)

Hume is famous for the view that “reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions.” His claim that “we are no sooner acquainted with the impossibility of satisfying any desire, than the desire itself vanishes” is less well known. Each seems, in opposite ways, shocking to common sense. This paper explores the latter claim, looking for its source in Hume’s account of the passions and exploring its compatibility with his associationist psychology. We are led to the (...) conclusion that this view—that desires vanish when fulfilment is deemed impossible—endows reason with a power over the passions that is at odds with its role as slave, and ultimately incompatible with a proper understanding of emotions such as grief. Such emotions involve continuing to want what one believes to be impossible. The human imagination can sustain desires without the belief that fulfilment is possible. (shrink)

In this closely argued book, Paul Russell challenges the standard way of capturing what Hume has to say on the subject of freedom and responsibility. The argument is not, however, one that derives from a narrow interest in discovering what Hume said and demonstrating its divergence from the common view. Russell’s goal is ultimately to use Hume “to shed light on contemporary philosophical problems”. Hume had already discovered, for example, the lesson that Strawson articulated in his critique of compatibilism and (...) its rivals in “Freedom and Resentment”; and Hume anticipates the work of Frankfurt, Nagel, and Hart, among others. (shrink)

Much recent work exploring a liberal theory of equality focuses on the questions of distributive justice and is thus relevant to a narrow range of legal questions. Equality, Responsibility, and the Law redresses this imbalance, reserving a single final chapter to questions of resource allocation and spending the other seven chapters on questions of equality relating to tort and crime. The book addresses a huge set of questions and—like some of the best work in philosophy—it gives the same answer to (...) all of them at an abstract level. It thus provides a coherent interpretive scheme for some of the most vexed terrain in the philosophy of law. The aim is to provide a way of looking at questions of responsibility in relation to both civil and criminal law and then explore the implications of this theory for the distribution of scarce resources. This is a Herculean task—and it is useful to think of the author as playing the role of a Dworkinian judge attempting to find a theory that gives integrity to the legal systems of Britain and North America. The dust jacket’s emphasis on legal luck hits an important theme of the book, but also obscures the extent to which this work concerns the justification of virtually every decision within common-law systems. (shrink)

The essay from the anthology to which I would award first prize is John Biro’s discussion, “Hume’s New Science of the Mind,” which reveals the extent to which Hume was already engaged in what we now call the “naturalization” of epistemology. Biro defends Hume’s causal account of personal identity and charts connections between his account of the mind and recent developments in cognitive science. Of course, some questions about Hume’s theory of mind remain unanswered. In particular, nothing is said in (...) explanation of Hume’s own lament that his account is incoherent. Nonetheless, this essay demonstrates the relevance and fascination of Hume. One is not left with the impression that a shorter essay could have done as much. On the contrary, I found myself wanting more. In the next discussion, Alex Rosenberg does an excellent job of defending the claim that no philosopher is more important than Hume in defining the themes that came to occupy philosophers of science in the twentieth century. The essay deals with the empiricist theory of meaning, causation, and induction, and the role of general laws in scientific explanations. (shrink)