Heidegger’s Relative Essentialism

Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 53 (1):40-60 (2022)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

There is relatively little comprehensive treatment of Heidegger’s theory of essences despite his ubiquitous use of essences. It is commonplace in contemporary analytic philosophy to view essences as the ground for true de re modal claims. I argue that Heidegger offers an account of essences that can best be understood as a type of relative essentialism. Relative essentialism is the view that more than one being can occupy the same space at the same time and those beings have distinct sets of de re modal truths about them. Heidegger’s account of essences allows for true de re modal claims about a wide variety of things including scientific and cultural entities. At the same time, Heidegger rejects absolute essentialism: the view that there is one privilege collection of beings whose natures determine the truth values of de re modal claims about them. Relative essentialism is distinguished from contextual essentialism.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,069

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Essentialism: Metaphysical or Psychological?Moti Mizrahi - 2014 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 14 (1):65-72.
Anti-Essentialism and Counterpart Theory.Mark Heller - 2005 - The Monist 88 (4):600-618.
Necessity and linguistic rules.Boris Kment - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
Descriptions, essences and quantified modal logic.John Woods - 1973 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 2 (2):304 - 321.
Essence and Being.Scott A. Shalkowski - 2008 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 62:49-63.

Analytics

Added to PP
2021-02-16

Downloads
33 (#500,331)

6 months
15 (#185,003)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Timothy Nulty
University of Massachusetts, Dartmouth

References found in this work

Fields of Sense: A New Realist Ontology.Markus Gabriel - 2015 - Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
On the essence of truth.Martin Heidegger - 1988 - In Martin Heidegger & Werner Brock (eds.), Existence and being. [U.S.]: Kampmann. pp. 274-287.
On the Essence of Truth (Pentecost Monday, 1926).Martin Heidegger - 1998 - New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy 9:274-287.
Background Practices: Essays on the Understanding of Being.Hubert L. Dreyfus - 2017 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. Edited by Mark A. Wrathall.

View all 14 references / Add more references