Predication, Intentionality and Relative Essentialism

Idealistic Studies 50 (3):275-289 (2020)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Relative essentialism is the novel metaphysical theory that there can be multiple objects occupying the same space at the same time each with its own de re modal truths. Relative essentialism is motivated by Davidson’s semantics and his denial that nature itself is divided into a privileged domain of objects. Relative essentialism was first presented by Samuel C. Wheeler. I argue that Wheeler’s approach to the Davidsonian program needs to be elaborated in terms of various types of preconceptual intentional relations. This elaboration is already largely implicit in Davidson’s own later work and in Wheeler’s relaunching of Davidsonian metaphysics. More specifically, I argue that relative essentialism is ultimately founded not on predication narrowly construed but on intentionality broadly construed. Following Wheeler’s suggestion, comparisons are made between relative essentialism and work within the phenomenological tradition.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,745

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Heidegger’s Relative Essentialism.Timothy J. Nulty - 2022 - Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 53 (1):40-60.
Anti-Essentialism and Counterpart Theory.Mark Heller - 2005 - The Monist 88 (4):600-618.
Essence and explanation: a logical mismatch.Aaron Segal & Noga Gratvol - 2021 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 64 (10):1038-1050.
Natural Kinds: (Thick) Essentialism or Promiscuous Realism?Nigel Leary - 2007 - Philosophical Writings 34 (1):5 - 13.
Essentialism: Metaphysical or Psychological?Moti Mizrahi - 2014 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 14 (1):65-72.
Relative essentialism.Evan Fales - 1979 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 30 (4):349-370.
The Harmony of Spinoza and Leibniz.Samuel Newlands - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):64-104.
Avicennian essentialism.Fedor Benevich - 2022 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 30 (3):410-433.
On Essentially Intentional Actions.Armand Babakhanian - 2024 - Dissertation, Georgia State University

Analytics

Added to PP
2020-11-11

Downloads
22 (#166,999)

6 months
10 (#1,198,792)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Timothy Nulty
University of Massachusetts, Dartmouth

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references