Authors
Michael Nielsen
University of Sydney
Rush T. Stewart
King's College London
Abstract
This essay has two aims. The first is to correct an increasingly popular way of misunderstanding Belot's Orgulity Argument. The Orgulity Argument charges Bayesianism with defect as a normative epistemology. For concreteness, our argument focuses on Cisewski et al.'s recent rejoinder to Belot. The conditions that underwrite their version of the argument are too strong and Belot does not endorse them on our reading. A more compelling version of the Orgulity Argument than Cisewski et al. present is available, however---a point that we make by drawing an analogy with de Finetti's argument against mandating countable additivity. Having presented the best version of the Orgulity Argument, our second aim is to develop a reply to it. We extend Elga's idea of appealing to finitely additive probability to show that the challenge posed by the Orgulity Argument can be met.
Keywords finite additivity  modesty  orgulity  probability  topology
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DOI 10.3998/ergo.12405314.0006.003
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References found in this work BETA

The Logic of Reliable Inquiry.Kevin T. Kelly - 1996 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press USA.
The Logic of Reliable Inquiry.Kevin Kelly - 1998 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (2):351-354.
Bayesian Orgulity.Gordon Belot - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (4):483-503.
Merging of Opinions and Probability Kinematics.Simon M. Huttegger - 2015 - Review of Symbolic Logic 8 (4):611-648.

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Citations of this work BETA

Convergence to the Truth Without Countable Additivity.Michael Nielsen - 2021 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 50 (2):395-414.
An ineffective antidote for hawkmoths.Roman Frigg & Leonard A. Smith - 2022 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 12 (2):1-24.

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