Synthese 191 (5):1-24 (2014)

Colin Howson
Last affiliation: London School of Economics
In this paper I argue that de Finetti provided compelling reasons for rejecting countable additivity. It is ironical therefore that the main argument advanced by Bayesians against following his recommendation is based on the consistency criterion, coherence, he himself developed. I will show that this argument is mistaken. Nevertheless, there remain some counter-intuitive consequences of rejecting countable additivity, and one in particular has all the appearances of a full-blown paradox. I will end by arguing that in fact it is no paradox, and that what it shows is that conditionalisation, often claimed to be integral to the Bayesian canon, has to be rejected as a general rule in a finitely additive environment
Keywords Finite additivity  Infinite lotteries  Coherence  Conditionalisation   de Finetti
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Reprint years 2014, 2016
DOI 10.1007/s11229-013-0303-3
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References found in this work BETA

The Logic of Scientific Discovery.Karl Raimund Popper - 1934 - London, England: Routledge.
Philosophical Papers.David Kellogg Lewis - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
The Logic of Scientific Discovery.K. Popper - 1959 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 10 (37):55-57.

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