Philosophy of Science 80 (4):483-503 (2013)

Gordon Belot
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
A piece of folklore enjoys some currency among philosophical Bayesians, according to which Bayesian agents that, intuitively speaking, spread their credence over the entire space of available hypotheses are certain to converge to the truth. The goals of the present discussion are to show that kernel of truth in this folklore is in some ways fairly small and to argue that Bayesian convergence-to-the-truth results are a liability for Bayesianism as an account of rationality, since they render a certain sort of arrogance rationally mandatory.
Keywords Bayesianism  Statistical Consistency
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1086/673249
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

References found in this work BETA

Theory and Evidence.Clark N. Glymour - 1980 - Princeton University Press.
The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1956 - Philosophy of Science 23 (2):166-166.
The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1959 - Synthese 11 (1):86-89.

View all 17 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Persistent Disagreement and Polarization in a Bayesian Setting.Michael Nielsen & Rush T. Stewart - 2021 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72 (1):51-78.
Should Agents Be Immodest?Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2021 - Analytic Philosophy 62 (3):235-251.
Exploring by Believing.Sara Aronowitz - 2021 - Philosophical Review 130 (3):339-383.
Bayesian Epistemology.William Talbott - 2006 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Bayesian Humility.Adam Elga - 2016 - Philosophy of Science 83 (3):305-323.

View all 27 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles


Added to PP index

Total views
264 ( #41,020 of 2,505,615 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
15 ( #54,103 of 2,505,615 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes