The gradation puzzle of intellectual assurance

Analysis 81 (3):488-496 (2021)
  Copy   BIBTEX


The Cartesian thesis that some justifications are infallible faces a gradation puzzle. On the one hand, infallible justification tolerates absolutely no possibility for error. On the other hand, infallible justifications can vary in evidential force: e.g. two persons can both be infallible regarding their pains while the one with stronger pain is nevertheless more justified. However, if a type of justification is gradable in strength, why can it always be absolute? This paper explores the potential of this gradation challenge by rejecting Fumerton's recent ‘semantic decision' solution. On Fumerton's suggestion, the putative gradation of infallible justifications is essentially semantic. It concerns only how we use the relevant term but not how well we perceive the truth. Regardless of its intuitive appeal, Fumerton's solution does not cover all the related situations. There is an irreducibly epistemic sense in which infallible justifications vary in degrees.


Added to PP

321 (#66,438)

6 months
144 (#27,393)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Xiaoxing Zhang
Université Paris-Sorbonne (PhD)

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Compassionate phenomenal conservatism.Michael Huemer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):30–55.
Reflective knowledge.Ernest Sosa - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Metaepistemology and Skepticism.Richard Fumerton - 1995 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 58 (4):905-906.
Phenomenal Conservatism and the Internalist Intuition.Michael Huemer - 2006 - American Philosophical Quarterly 43 (2):147-158.
Metaepistemology and Skepticism.Richard Fumerton - 1997 - Mind 106 (424):782-787.

View all 31 references / Add more references