Dialogue:1-23 (forthcoming)

Kirk Lougheed
University of Pretoria
Consider two epistemically possible worlds that are as similar as can be, except that atheism is true in one world and theism is true in the other world. Which world is it rational to prefer? I explore the strongest defence of the somewhat counterintuitive claim that it is rational to prefer the atheistic world. I also discuss the opposite conclusion, namely, that it’s rational to prefer the theistic world. Surprisingly, my conclusion is that it’s difficult to tell whether to prefer theism or atheism overall.Considérons deux mondes épistémiquement possibles qui sont aussi similaires que possible, sauf que l’athéisme est vrai dans un monde et que le théisme est vrai dans l’autre monde. Quel monde est-il rationnel de préférer? J’examine la défense la plus forte de l’affirmation quelque peu contre-intuitive selon laquelle il est rationnel de préférer le monde athée. Je discute également de la conclusion opposée, à savoir qu’il est rationnel de préférer le monde théiste. Étonnamment, ma conclusion est qu’il est difficile de dire s’il faut préférer le théisme ou l’athéisme en général.
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DOI 10.1017/s0012217318000574
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References found in this work BETA

Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.
Reflection and Disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.
The Nature of Epistemic Space.David Chalmers - 2011 - In Andy Egan & Brian Weatherson (eds.), Epistemic Modality. Oxford University Press.
Should We Want God to Exist?Guy Kahane - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (3):674-696.
Counterfactual Philosophers.Nathan Ballantyne - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):368-387.

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