Theistic Arguments from Horrendous Evils

Philosophy Compass 17 (8):e12866 (2022)
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While the existence of horrendous evils has generally been taken to be evidence against the existence of God, some philosophers have suggested that it may be evidence for the existence of God. This paper introduces three main kinds of theistic arguments from horrendous evils: the argument from objectively horrifying evils, the pragmatic argument from evil, and an argument from reasonable responses. For each of these arguments, I will first reconstruct a standard version of the argument, before suggesting ways the argument may be challenged, or further developed.

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Daryl Ooi
National University of Singapore

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Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism.David Enoch - 2011 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
Moral realism: a defence.Russ Shafer-Landau - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.
A Darwinian dilemma for realist theories of value.Sharon Street - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (1):109-166.
Moral realism.Peter Railton - 1986 - Philosophical Review 95 (2):163-207.

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