This edited collection explores the philosophy of Clarence Irving Lewis through two major concepts that are integral to his conceptual pragmatism: the a priori and the given. The relation between these two elements of knowledge form the core of Lewis’s masterpiece _Mind and the World-Order_. While Lewis’s conceptual pragmatism is directed against any conception of the _a priori_ as constraining the mind and experience, it also emphasizes the inalterability and the unavoidability of the given that remains the same through any (...) interpretation of it by the mind. The essays in this volume probe Lewis’s new account of the relation between the a priori and the given in dialogue with other notable figures in 20 th -century philosophy, including Carnap, Friedman, Goodman, Putnam, Quine, Russell, Sellars, and Sheffer. _C.I. Lewis’s Conceptual Pragmatism_ __represents a focused treatment of a long-neglected figure in 20 th -century American philosophy. (shrink)

This edited collection explores the philosophy of Clarence Irving Lewis through two major concepts that are integral to his conceptual pragmatism: the a priori and the given. The relation between these two elements of knowledge form the core of Lewis's masterpiece Mind and the World-Order. While Lewis's conceptual pragmatism is directed against any conception of the a priori as constraining the mind and experience, it also emphasizes the inalterability and the unavoidability of the given that remains the same through any (...) interpretation of it by the mind. The essays in this volume probe Lewis's new account of the relation between the a priori and the given in dialogue with other notable figures in 20th-century philosophy, including Carnap, Friedman, Goodman, Putnam, Quine, Russell, Sellars, and Sheffer. C.I. Lewis: The A Priori and the Given represents a focused treatment of a long-neglected figure in 20th-century American philosophy. (shrink)

Dans Manières de faire des mondes, Goodman soutient que le monde est de notre fait et qu’il existe autant de mondes actuels que de versions correctes que nous en donnons. Le présent article se propose d’expliquer quels sont le sens et le statut de cette affirmation, en la replaçant dans le contexte du problème qu’elle est supposée résoudre : qu’il existe plusieurs mondes qui sont de notre fait permet de penser la distinction du correct et de l’incorrect alors que nous (...) tenons pour correctes des versions incompatibles du monde. Qu’il existe plusieurs mondes fait en définitive l’objet d’une affirmation temporaire à laquelle Goodman ne tient pas tellement. L’essentiel est de reconnaître que les termes comme « monde » ou « totalité » n’ont aucun sens absolument parlant, c’est-à-dire en dehors d’une version particulière. (shrink)