Philosophia 48 (2):573-586 (2020)

If there is something (P) that every possible agent is committed to value, and certain actions or attitudes either enhance or diminish P, then normative claims about a range of intentional actions can be objectively and non-trivially evaluated. I argue that the degree of existence as an agent depends on the consistency of reflexive-relating with other individuals of the agent-kind: the ontological thesis. I then show that in intending to act on a reason, every agent is rationally committed to value ‘above all else’ being an agent, what consists in exercising the capacity to act and having the freedom to discriminate between more or less valuable actions: the transcendental thesis. Since the degree of possession of this personal but non-contingent good depends on relating to other agents in a special way, certain actions and attitudes may be objectively right or wrong for all agents.
Keywords Metanormative Realism  Normativity  Metaethics  Agency  Social Ontology  Relational Ontology of Self
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Reprint years 2019, 2020
DOI 10.1007/s11406-019-00149-6
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References found in this work BETA

What is It Like to Be a Bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.
Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Harvard University Press.
The Sources of Normativity.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Ethics of Vaccine Refusal.Michael Kowalik - forthcoming - Journal of Medical Ethics.
Transcendental Theology for Non-Believers.Michael Kowalik - forthcoming - African Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences.

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