Contrastive knowledge

Philosophical Explorations 6 (2):74 – 89 (2003)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

We describe the three place relation of contrastive knowledge, which holds between a person, a target proposition, and a contrasting proposition. The person knows that p rather than that q. We argue for three claims about this relation. (a) Many common sense and philosophical ascriptions of knowledge can be understood in terms of it. (b) Its application is subject to fewer complications than non-contrastive knowledge is. (c) It applies over a wide range of human and nonhuman cases.

Similar books and articles

The Knowledge Relation: Binary or Ternary?René van Woudenberg - 2008 - Social Epistemology 22 (3):281-288.
The Knowledge Relation: Binary or Ternary? Ren - 2008 - Social Epistemology 22 (3):281 – 288.
The Contrast-Sensitivity of Knowledge Ascriptions.Jonathan Schaffer - 2008 - Social Epistemology 22 (3):235-245.
Contrastive Knowledge: Reply to Baumann.Jonathan Schaffer - 2012 - In Stefan Tolksdorf (ed.), The Concept of Knowledge. Walter de Gruyter. pp. 411-24.
Contrastivity and Indistinguishability.Adam Morton & Antti Karjalainen - 2008 - Social Epistemology 22 (3):271 – 280.
Contrastive Causation.Jonathan Schaffer - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (3):327-358.
Contrastive Knowledge.Jonathan Schaffer - 2005 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology 1. Oxford University Press. pp. 235.
A Counterexample to the Contrastive Account of Knowledge.Jason Rourke - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (3):637-643.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
405 (#26,443)

6 months
25 (#41,740)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Adam Morton
PhD: Princeton University; Last affiliation: University of British Columbia

Citations of this work

Cause and Norm.Christopher Hitchcock & Joshua Knobe - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy 106 (11):587-612.
Knowing the Answer.Jonathan Schaffer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):383-403.
Knowledge Ascriptions and the Psychological Consequences of Changing Stakes.Jennifer Nagel - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):279-294.

View all 41 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Epistemology and Cognition.Alvin Ira Goldman - 1986 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard University Press.
Elusive Knowledge.David K. Lewis - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.

View all 37 references / Add more references