Social Epistemology 22 (3):235-245 (2008)
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Abstract |
Knowledge ascriptions are contrast-sensitive. One natural explanation for this is that the knowledge relation is contrastive ( s knows that p rather than q ). But can the binary view of knowledge ( s knows that p ) explain contrast-sensitivity? I review some of the linguistic data supporting contrast-sensitivity, and critique the three main binary explanations for contrast-sensitivity. I conclude that the contrast-sensitivity of knowledge ascriptions shows that knowledge is a contrastive relation
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DOI | 10.1080/02691720802546112 |
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References found in this work BETA
Assertion.Robert Stalnaker - 1978 - In Maite Ezcurdia & Robert J. Stainton (eds.), The Semantics-Pragmatics Boundary in Philosophy. Broadview Press. pp. 179.
Epistemic Operators.Fred Dretske - 1970 - In Keith DeRose & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Skepticism: A Contemporary Reader. Oup Usa.
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Citations of this work BETA
Cause and Norm.Christopher Hitchcock & Joshua Knobe - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy 106 (11):587-612.
Reason Claims and Contrastivism About Reasons.Justin Snedegar - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (2):231-242.
View all 30 citations / Add more citations
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