An Epistemic Reduction of Contrastive Knowledge Claims

Social Epistemology 24 (2):99-104 (2010)
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Abstract

Contrastive epistemologists say knowledge displays the ternary relation “S knows p rather than q”. I argue that “S knows p rather than q” is often equivalent to “S knows p rather than not-p” and hence equivalent to “S knows p”. The result is that contrastive knowledge is often binary knowledge disguised.

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Joel Buenting
University of Alberta

References found in this work

Moral skepticisms.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2006 - New York: Oxford University Press.
From contextualism to contrastivism.Jonathan Schaffer - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 119 (1-2):73-104.
Contrastive knowledge.Jonathan Schaffer - 2005 - In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 235.
Contrastive Knowledge.Adam Morton - 2012 - In Martijn Blaauw (ed.), Contrastivism in Philosophy. New York: Routledge. pp. 101-115.
The Contrast-sensitivity of Knowledge Ascriptions.Jonathan Schaffer - 2008 - Social Epistemology 22 (3):235-245.

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