Abstract
The harshness objection is the most important challenge to luck egalitarianism. Very recently, Andreas Albertsen and Lasse Nielsen provided a scrupulous analysis of the harshness objection and claim that only the inconsistency objection—the objection that luck egalitarianism is incompatible with the ideal of basic moral equality—has real bite. I argue that the relevantly construed incoherence objection is not as strong as Albertsen and Nielsen believe. In doing so, first, I show that the deontological luck egalitarian conception of equal treatment does not endorse harsh policies such as excessive responsibility-sensitive healthcare that would be disrespectful to the imprudent. Second, I demonstrate that deontological luck egalitarianism is not troubled by the case that involves a lack of respect for the prudent, which vexes Anderson’s relational egalitarianism that Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen’s argument highlights. I thus claim that the harshness objection is not a truly decisive objection against the luck egalitarian project.