Can Luck Egalitarianism Be Really Saved By Value Pluralism?
Abstract
In this paper I discuss a frequent reply to what is usually called ‘the harshness objection,’ or “the abandonment objection” to luck egalitarianism. This objection has been used by Elizabeth Anderson to argue that luck egalitarianism is not, in any of its versions, an adequate interpretation of the ideal of social justice. According to the luck egalitarian reply discussed in this paper, luck egalitarianism can be saved from the harshness objection by value pluralism. After a few short considerations on luck egalitarianism, on the harshness objection invoked by Anderson, and on pluralism as a strategy of dealing with this objection, I will try to show that, in fact, luck egalitarianism cannot be saved from the harshness objection by value pluralism