Argumentation 6 (2):251-270 (1992)

Abstract
Relevance is a triadic relation between an item, an outcome or goal, and a situation. Causal relevance consists in an item's ability to help produce an outcome in a situation. Epistemic relevance, a distinct concept, consists in the ability of a piece of information (or a speech act communicating or requesting a piece of information) to help achieve an epistemic goal in a situation. It has this ability when it can be ineliminably combined with other at least potentially accurate information to achieve the goal. The relevance of a conversational contribution, premiss relevance and conclusion relevance are species of epistemic relevance thus defined. The conception of premiss relevance which results provides a basis for determining when the various ‘arguments ad’ called fallacies of relevance are indeed irrelevant. In particular, an ad verecundiam appeal is irrelevant if the authority cited lacks expertise in a cognitive domain to which the conclusion belongs, the authority does not exercise its expertise in coming to endorse the conclusion, or the conclusion does not belong to a cognitive domain; otherwise the ad verecundiam is relevant
Keywords Argument  argumentation  arguments ad  argumentum ad verecundiam  causal relevance  conversation  epistemic relevance  fallacies  Locke  relevance
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DOI 10.1007/BF00154329
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References found in this work BETA

An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.John Locke - 1689 - London, England: Oxford University Press.
Fallacies.Charles Leonard Hamblin - 1970 - London, England: Vale Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Understanding Epistemic Relevance.Luciano Floridi - 2008 - Erkenntnis 69 (1):69-92.
Inference Claims.David Hitchcock - 2011 - Informal Logic 31 (3):191-229.
How Philosophical is Informal Logic?John Woods - 2000 - Informal Logic 20 (2).
Case-to-Case Arguments.Katharina Stevens - 2018 - Argumentation 32 (3):431-455.

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