Modest Infinitism

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (4):537 - 562 (2003)
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Abstract

Modest Infinitism Jeremy Fantl Abstract Infinitism, a theory of justification most recently developed and defended by Peter Klein, is the view that justification is a matter of having an infinite series of non-repeating reasons for a proposition. I argue that infinitism is preferable to other theories (like foundationalism) in that only infinitism can plausibly account for two important features of justification: 1) that it admits of degrees and 2) that a concept of complete justification makes sense.

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Jeremy Fantl
University of Calgary

Citations of this work

The Unity of Grounding.Selim Berker - 2018 - Mind 127 (507):729-777.
On the regress argument for infinitism.John Turri - 2009 - Synthese 166 (1):157 - 163.
Introdução ao infinitismo na epistemologia : uma resposta ao Trilema de Agripa.Samuel Cibils - 2023 - Dissertation, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio Grande Do Sul

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References found in this work

Persons, Character, and Morality.Bernard Williams - 1976 - In James Rachels (ed.), Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973–1980. Cambridge University Press.
The Scientist Qua Scientist Makes Value Judgments.Richard Rudner - 1953 - Philosophy of Science 20 (1):1-6.
Moral Luck.Bernard Williams - 1981 - Critica 17 (51):101-105.
What The Tortoise Said To Achilles.Lewis Carroll - 1895 - Mind 104 (416):691-693.

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