40 found
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  1. Knowledge in an uncertain world.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Matthew McGrath.
    Introduction -- Fallibilism -- Contextualism -- Knowledge and reasons -- Justification -- Belief -- The value and importance of knowledge -- Infallibilism or pragmatic encroachment? -- Appendix I: Conflicts with bayesian decision theory? -- Appendix II: Does KJ entail infallibilism?
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  2. Evidence, pragmatics, and justification.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (1):67-94.
    Evidentialism is the thesis that epistemic justification for belief supervenes on evidential support. However, we claim there are cases in which, even though two subjects have the same evidential support for a proposition, only one of them is justified. What make the difference are pragmatic factors, factors having to do with our cares and concerns. Our argument against evidentialism is not based on intuitions about particular cases. Rather, we aim to provide a theoretical basis for rejecting evidentialism by defending a (...)
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  3. The Limitations of the Open Mind.Jeremy Fantl - 2018 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
    When should you engage with difficult arguments against your cherished controversial beliefs? The primary conclusion of this book is that your obligations to engage with counterarguments are more limited than is often thought. In some standard situations, you shouldn't engage with difficult counterarguments and, if you do, you shouldn't engage with them open-mindedly. This conclusion runs counter to aspects of the Millian political tradition and political liberalism, as well as what people working in informal logic tend to say about argumentation. (...)
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  4. Knowing-how and knowing-that.Jeremy Fantl - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (3):451–470.
    You know that George W. Bush is the U.S. president, but you know how to ride a bicycle. What's the difference? According to intellectualists, not much: either knowing how to do something is a matter of knowing that something is the case or, at the very least, know-how requires a prior bit of theoretical knowledge. Anti-intellectualists deny this order of priority: either knowing-how and knowing-that are independent or, at the very least, knowing that something is the case requires a prior (...)
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  5. Fake News vs. Echo Chambers.Jeremy Fantl - 2021 - Social Epistemology 35 (6):645-659.
    I argue that there is a prima facie tension between solutions to the problem of fake news and solutions to the problem presented by various cognitive biases that dispose us to dismiss evidence against our prior beliefs (what might seem to be the driving force behind echo chambers). We can guard against fake news by strengthening belief. But we can exit echo chambers by becoming more sensitive to counterevidence, which seems to require weakening our beliefs. I resolve the tension by (...)
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  6. Knowledge How.Jeremy Fantl - 2012 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  7. Mary Shepherd on Causal Necessity.Jeremy Fantl - 2016 - Metaphysica 17 (1):87-108.
    Lady Mary Shepherd’s critique of Hume’s account of causation, his worries about knowledge of matters of fact, and the contention that it is possible for the course of nature to spontaneously change relies primarily on three premises, two of which – that objects are merely bundles of qualities and that the qualities of an object are individuated by the causal powers contributed by those qualities – anticipate contemporary metaphysical views in ways that she should be getting credit for. The remaining (...)
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  8. Pragmatic encroachment: It's not just about knowledge.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2012 - Episteme 9 (1):27-42.
    There is pragmatic encroachment on some epistemic status just in case whether a proposition has that status for a subject depends not only on the subject's epistemic position with respect to the proposition, but also on features of the subject's non-epistemic, practical environment. Discussions of pragmatic encroachment usually focus on knowledge. Here we argue that, barring infallibilism, there is pragmatic encroachment on what is arguably a more fundamental epistemic status – the status a proposition has when it is warranted enough (...)
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  9. Modest Infinitism.Jeremy Fantl - 2003 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (4):537 - 562.
    Modest Infinitism -/- Jeremy Fantl -/- Abstract -/- Infinitism, a theory of justification most recently developed and defended by Peter Klein, is the view that justification is a matter of having an infinite series of non-repeating reasons for a proposition. I argue that infinitism is preferable to other theories (like foundationalism) in that only infinitism can plausibly account for two important features of justification: 1) that it admits of degrees and 2) that a concept of complete justification makes sense.
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  10. Ryle’s regress defended.Jeremy Fantl - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (1):121-130.
  11.  67
    Guidance and mainstream epistemology.Jeremy Fantl - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (7):2191-2210.
    According to one prominent critique of mainstream epistemology, discoveries about what it takes to know or justifiedly believe that p can’t provide the right kind of intellectual guidance. As Mark Webb puts it, “the kinds of principles that are developed in this tradition are of no use in helping people in their ordinary epistemic practices.” In this paper I defend a certain form of traditional epistemology against this “regulative” critique. Traditional epistemology can provide—and, indeed, can be essential for—intellectual guidance. The (...)
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  12. Advice for fallibilists: put knowledge to work.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (1):55-66.
    We begin by asking what fallibilism about knowledge is, distinguishing several conceptions of fallibilism and giving reason to accept what we call strong epistemic fallibilism, the view that one can know that something is the case even if there remains an epistemic chance, for one, that it is not the case. The task of the paper, then, concerns how best to defend this sort of fallibilism from the objection that it is “mad,” that it licenses absurd claims such as “I (...)
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  13. Contextualism and Subject‐Sensitivity.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3):693-702.
    Contribution to a symposium on Keith DeRose's book, The Case for Contextualism: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context.
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  14.  87
    What Is It to Be Happy That P?Jeremy Fantl - 2015 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 2.
    This paper offers a new argument that your reasons for believing or acting need not be true. It proceeds indirectly through an account of what it takes to be happy that p. To be happy that p is for p to be among your reasons for being happy. That’s because questions about why you’re happy and what you’re happy is the case are interchangeable. But, I argue, it is possible to be happy that p even when p is false. In (...)
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  15. Radical Knowledge Minimalism.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2023 - Logos and Episteme 14 (2):223-227.
    We argue that knowledge doesn‘t require any of truth, justification, or belief. This is so for four primary reasons. First, each of the three conditions has been subject to convincing counterexamples. In addition, the resultant account explains the value of knowledge, manifests important theoretical virtues (in particular, simplicity), and avoids commitment to skepticism.
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  16. Is metaethics morally neutral?Jeremy Fantl - 2006 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (1):24–44.
    I argue, contra Dreier, Blackburn, and others, that there are no morally neutral metaethical positions. Every metaethical position commits you to the denial of some moral statement. So, for example, the metaethical position that there are no moral properties commits you to the denial of the moral conjunction of 1) it is right to interfere violently when someone is wrongly causing massive suffering and 2) it is wrong to interfere violently when only non-moral properties are at stake. The argument generalizes (...)
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  17.  48
    Entitlement and misleading evidence.Jeremy Fantl - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (3):743-761.
    The standard conception of misleading evidence has it that e is misleading evidence that p iff e is evidence that p and p is false. I argue that this conception yields incorrect verdicts when we consider what it is for evidence to be misleading with respect to questions like whether p. Instead, we should adopt a conception of misleading evidence according to which e is misleading with respect to a question only if e is in-fact irrelevant to that question – (...)
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  18.  54
    A Defense of Dogmatism.Jeremy Fantl - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 4:34-57.
    Dogmatism is the view that it is often legitimate to flatly dismiss counterarguments to a belief: your belief can count as knowledge even if you can’t figure out what’s wrong with the counterargument. Hume defended a version of dogmatism restricted to testimony in favor of miracles. Moore defended a dogmatism restricted to arguments for skepticism. In this paper it is argued that Hume’s and Moore’s dogmatisms should be generalized to all controversial matters. Dogmatism about controversial matters is true if you (...)
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  19. Replies to Cohen, Neta and Reed.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):473-490.
  20. Sensations, swatches, and speckled hens.Jeremy Fantl & Robert J. Howell - 2003 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (4):371-383.
    We argue that there is a interesting connection between the old problem of the Speckled Hen and an argument that can be traced from Russell to Armstrong to Putnam that we call the “gradation argument.” Both arguments have been used to show that there is no “Highest Common Factor” between appearances we judge the same – no such thing as “real” sensations. But, we argue, both only impugn the assumption of epistemic certainty regarding introspective reports.
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  21.  44
    Epistemology: An Anthology.Jaegwon Kim, Jeremy Fantl & Matthew Mcgrath (eds.) - 2008 - Wiley.
    New and thoroughly updated, Epistemology: An Anthology continues to represent the most comprehensive and authoritative collection of canonical readings in the theory of knowledge. Concentrates on the central topics of the field, such as skepticism and the Pyrrhonian problematic, the definition of knowledge, and the structure of epistemic justification Offers coverage of more specific topics, such as foundationalism vs coherentism, and virtue epistemology Presents wholly new sections on 'Testimony, Memory, and Perception' and 'The Value of Knowledge' Features modified sections on (...)
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  22.  24
    Contemporary epistemology: an anthology.Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath & Ernest Sosa (eds.) - 2019 - Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.
    A rigorous, authoritative new anthology which brings together some of the most significant contemporary scholarship on the theory of knowledge Carefully-calibrated and judiciously-curated, this strong and contemporary new anthology builds upon Epistemology: An Anthology, Second Edition (Wiley Blackwell, 2008) by drawing a concise and well-balanced selection of higher-level readings from a large, diverse, and evolving body of research. Includes 17 readings that represent a broad and vital part of contemporary epistemology, including articles by female philosophers and emerging thought leaders Organized (...)
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  23.  29
    Disingenuous Infallibilism.Jeremy Fantl - 2023 - The Monist 106 (4):446-460.
    Some recent epistemologists propose that certainty is the norm of action and assertion. This proposal is subject to skeptical worries. If, as is usually supposed, certainty is very hard to come by, legitimate action and assertion will be rare. To remedy this, some have conjoined their certainty-norms with a context-sensitive semantics for ‘certainty’. For a proposition to be certain for you, you only need to be able to exclude relevant alternatives. I argue that, depending on what makes an alternative relevant, (...)
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  24. Evidentialism as an Historical Theory.Jeremy Fantl - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (4):778-791.
    According to time-slice epistemology, what attitudes you should have at a time supervenes on features of you—like your evidence or mental states—at that time. Evidentialism is commonly assumed to b...
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  25.  88
    What’s the Point of Knowledge? A Function-First Epistemology.Jeremy Fantl - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (4):834-834.
    In this excellent and well-argued book, Michael Hannon defends two primary claims: first, the function of knowledge-attributions is primarily that of flagging reliable informants; second, proper ep...
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  26. Truth and Epistemology.Matthew McGrath & Jeremy Fantl - 2013 - In John Turri (ed.), Virtuous Thoughts: The Philosophy of Ernest Sosa. Springer. pp. 127--145.
    In Sect. 1 of this chapter, Matthew McGrath examines Sosa's work on the nature of truth. Sosa's chief purpose is to determine what sort of theory of truth is appropriate for truth-centered epistemology -- an epistemology that takes truth to be the goal of inquiry and which explains key epistemic notions in terms of truth. While Sosa refutes arguments from Putnam and Davidson against the correspondence theory, he is hesitant to endorse it because he doubts we have a clear enough (...)
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  27. An analysis of the a priori and a posteriori.Jeremy Fantl - 2003 - Acta Analytica 18 (1-2):43-69.
    I present and defend a unified, non-reductive analysis of the a priori and a posteriori. It is a mistake to remove all epistemic conditions from the analysis of the a priori (as, for example, Alvin Goldman has recently suggested doing). We can keep epistemic conditions (like unrevisability) in the analysis as long as we insist that a priori and a posteriori justification admit of degrees. I recommend making the degree to which a belief’s justification is a priori or a posteriori (...)
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  28. Arda Denkel, Object and Property Reviewed by.Jeremy Fantl - 1997 - Philosophy in Review 17 (3):162-164.
     
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  29. DM Armstrong, CB Martin and UT Place, Dispositions: A Debate Reviewed by.Jeremy Fantl - 1997 - Philosophy in Review 17 (2):80-82.
     
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  30.  45
    Epistemology and the Regress Problem. By Scott Aikin.Jeremy Fantl - 2012 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 2 (2):157-160.
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  31.  48
    Human knowledge/human knowers: Comments on Michael Williams' “what's so special about human knowledge?”.Jeremy Fantl - 2015 - Episteme 12 (2):269-273.
    In Michael Williams' “What's So Special About Human knowledge?” he argues that the kind of knowledge characteristic of adult humans is distinctive in that it involves epistemic responsibility. In particular, when an adult human has knowledge, they have a certain kind of epistemic authority, and that to attribute knowledge to them is to grant them a certain kind of authority over the subject matter. I argue that, while it is true that when we attribute knowledge to adult humans, we typically (...)
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  32.  56
    How We Should Teach Plantinga’s Possible Persons.Jeremy Fantl - 2000 - Teaching Philosophy 23 (4):329-342.
    While it is often undesirable and difficult to introduce highly complex arguments in large introductory philosophy classes, it is important to do so at least once in the semester as it challenges students, shows how philosophical debates often go beyond one’s initial intuitions, and illustrates how meaningful answers often turn on close attention to logical minutiae. This paper provides an example of an advanced debate on the free-will response to the problem of evil that can be used in introductory courses (...)
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  33.  44
    Infinitism and Practical Conditions on Justification.Jeremy Fantl - 2011 - Logos and Episteme 2 (2):191-209.
    This paper brings together two recent developments in the theory of epistemic justification: practical conditions on justification, and infinitism (the view thatjustification is a matter of having an infinite series of non-repeating reasons). Pragmatic principles can be used to argue that, if we’re looking for an ‘objective’ theory of the structure of justification – a theory that applies to all subjects independently of their practical context – infinitism stands the only chance at being the correct theory.
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  34. Revisability and the a Priori.Jeremy Fantl - 2000 - Dissertation, Brown University
    I argue in favor of the possibility of real a priori justification. Some writers have claimed that, to adequately defend against the naturalist, we should grant that a priori justification can be defeated by further experiential evidence. Such writers generally view a priori faculties as on a par with empirical faculties but with different proper objects. While perceptual objects are the contingently existing things with which we are in causal contact, a priori objects are either necessarily true propositions or necessarily (...)
     
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  35.  33
    Thinking about knowing.Jeremy Fantl - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (1):228–231.
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  36. Critical study of John Hawthorne's knowledge and lotteries and Jason Stanley's knowledge and practical interests. [REVIEW]Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2009 - Noûs 43 (1):178-192.
  37. Précis of Knowledge in an Uncertain World. [REVIEW]Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):441-446.
  38. Arda Denkel, Object and Property. [REVIEW]Jeremy Fantl - 1997 - Philosophy in Review 17:162-164.
     
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  39. D.M. Armstrong, C.B. Martin And U.T. Place, Dispositions: A Debate. [REVIEW]Jeremy Fantl - 1997 - Philosophy in Review 17:80-82.
     
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  40.  6
    Thinking About Knowing. [REVIEW]Jeremy Fantl - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (1):228-231.
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