On the regress argument for infinitism

Synthese 166 (1):157 - 163 (2009)

Abstract

This paper critically evaluates the regress argument for infinitism. The dialectic is essentially this. Peter Klein argues that only an infinitist can, without being dogmatic, enhance the credibility of a questioned non-evident proposition. In response, I demonstrate that a foundationalist can do this equally well. Furthermore, I explain how foundationalism can provide for infinite chains of justification. I conclude that the regress argument for infinitism should not convince us.

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John Turri
University of Waterloo

References found in this work

The Skeptic and the Dogmatist.James Pryor - 2000 - Noûs 34 (4):517–549.
What's Wrong with Moore's Argument?James Pryor - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):349–378.
Human Knowledge and the Infinite Regress of Reasons.Peter D. Klein - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13:297-325.
Modest Infinitism.Jeremy Fantl - 2003 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (4):537 - 562.

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