On 'What makes killing wrong?'

Journal of Medical Ethics 39 (1):8-8 (2013)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Franklin Miller1 make a convincing case for their claim that what is wrong about killing someone is that one is putting the person in a state of universal and irreversible disability. Thus, killing in and of itself is not an additional harm for a person who has been universally and irreversibly disabled. The implications for such a view are, as they note, quite wide-ranging. Given advances in medical technology, there are individuals being kept alive now who are universally and irreversibly disabled. Not only would death not be viewed as an additional harm, but it may also be the case that the organs of such individuals should be made available to save the lives of those who are not universally and irreversibly disabled. Given how Sinnott-Armstrong and Miller spell out what universal and irreversible mean, I am in broad …

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,752

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

What makes killing wrong?Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Franklin G. Miller - 2013 - Journal of Medical Ethics 39 (1):3-7.
Killing and dying.Dan Moller - 2006 - American Philosophical Quarterly 43 (3):235-247.
Life-prolonging killings and their relevance to ethics.Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen - 1999 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2 (2):135-147.
Epicurus, Death, and the Wrongness of Killing.Mikel Burley - 2010 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 53 (1):68-86.
A critique of “the best secular argument against abortion”.C. Strong - 2008 - Journal of Medical Ethics 34 (10):727-731.
Killing humans and killing animals.Peter Singer - 1979 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 22 (1-4):145 – 156.
Futures of Value and the Destruction of Human Embryos.Rob Lovering - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (3):pp. 463-88.
The basis of moral liability to defensive killing.Jeff McMahan - 2005 - Philosophical Issues 15 (1):386–405.
A critique of the preference utilitarian objection to killing people.Suzanne Uniacke - 2002 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (2):209 – 217.
What is wrong with killing people?R. E. Ewin - 1972 - Philosophical Quarterly 22 (87):126-139.
What Is So Wrong with Killing People?Robert Young - 1979 - Philosophy 54 (210):515-528.
In defence of honour.Kwame Anthony Appiah & Julian Baggini - 2011 - The Philosophers' Magazine 53 (53):22-31.

Analytics

Added to PP
2012-08-12

Downloads
58 (#275,548)

6 months
4 (#778,909)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Julia Driver
University of Texas at Austin

Citations of this work

‘Total disability’ and the wrongness of killing.Adam Omelianchuk - 2015 - Journal of Medical Ethics 41 (8):661-662.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references