Sobre el etnocentrismo y la paradoja de la convicción

Factótum. Revista de Filosofía 20 (21):1-12 (2019)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

G. A. Cohen (2000) provided us with a challenging “paradox of conviction” by means of pointing out the fact that, even when we realize that we hold certain beliefs (for example, political or religious ones) only because we have been raised to have them, this discovery does not modify what we believe. This seems to be irrational, but acknowledging that fact would entail that irrationality is much more widespread than we are, in principle, willing to accept. In this article we will focus on the solution proposed by Federico Penelas (2007), according to which the paradox can be dissolved by appealing to Rorty’s “ethnocentrism”. We will try to argue that this solution can work insofar as what supports our choice to retain our “convictions” is not theoretical in character, but practical. The reason why we can continue to support certain positions that lack neutral evidence in their favour is that it would be too costly not to do it—a condition which does not, nonetheless, make it any more probable that the positions in question are theoretically acceptable.

Links

PhilArchive

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Ethnocentrism: Lessons from Richard Rorty to Randy David.Tracy Llanera - 2017 - Philippine Sociological Review 65:133-149.
Liberalism, Ethnocentrism, and Solidarity: Reflections on Rorty.David Rondel - 2009 - Journal of Philosophical Research 34:55-68.
Liberalism, Ethnocentrism, and Solidarity.David Rondel - 2009 - Journal of Philosophical Research 34:55-68.
Rorty on belief and self‐deception.Béla Szabados - 1974 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 17 (1):464-473.
How to Understand and Solve the Lottery Paradox.Patrick Bondy - 2013 - Logos and Episteme 4 (3):283-292.
'Hold the being': How to split Rorty between irony and finitude.Rudi Visker - 1999 - Philosophy and Social Criticism 25 (2):27-45.
The Irony of a Contingent Solidarity.Rudi Visker - 1996 - Ethical Perspectives 3 (2):91-100.
Burge on Epistemic Paradox.Byeong D. Lee - 1998 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 28 (3):337 - 348.
A paradox of definability: Richard's and poincaré's ways out.Keith Simmons - 1994 - History and Philosophy of Logic 15 (1):33-44.
A Moorean paradox of desire.David Wall - 2012 - Philosophical Explorations 15 (1):63-84.

Analytics

Added to PP
2020-10-22

Downloads
213 (#70,561)

6 months
45 (#46,491)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity.Richard Rorty - 1989 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Peer disagreement and higher order evidence.Thomas Kelly - 2010 - In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. Oxford University Press. pp. 183--217.
Objectivity, relativism, and truth.Richard Rorty - 1990 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Irrelevant Influences.Katia Vavova - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:134-152.
Deciding to believe.Bernard Williams - 1973 - In Problems of the Self. Cambridge University Press. pp. 136--51.

View all 18 references / Add more references