Moore's paradox is a paradox in which certain kinds of belief or assertion, such as a belief that ?it is raining and I do not believe that it is raining?, are irrational despite involving no obvious contradiction in what is believed. But is there a parallel paradox involving other kinds of attitude, in particular desire? I argue that certain kinds of desire would be irrational to have for similar, distinctive reasons that having Moorean beliefs would be irrational to have. Hence, (...) I argue that such desires, a desire that ?one have a particular desire that was frustrated? or a desire that ?some state of affairs obtain about which one was indifferent?, are a parallel Moorean paradox of desire. I further argue that this analogous paradox has implications for practical reasoning, in particular by presenting a problem for instrumentalism about the objects of desire. (shrink)

What is the relation between desire and action? According to a traditional, widespread and influential view I call ‘The Motivational Necessity of Desire’ (MN), having a desire that p entails being disposed to act in ways that you believe will bring about p. But what about desires like a desire that the committee chooses you without your needing to do anything, or a desire that your child passes her exams on her own? Such ‘self-passive’ desires are often given as a (...) counter-example to MN. If MN is true then self-passive desires seem absurd: if someone has a self-passive desire she will be disposed to act, thereby preventing her from getting what she desires. But it seems that we can reasonably, and often do, have such desires. However, I argue that self-passive desires are not, in fact, counter-examples to MN: close consideration of the content of these desires, the contexts in which we ascribe them, and what is claimed by MN show that they are not a problem for that view. I also argue that strengthened versions of the examples are unsuccessful, and I offer a diagnosis of why these kinds of case are commonly thought to raise a challenge to MN. (shrink)

According to Gary Watson (1977), if we choose not to implement a judgment about what it is best to do then we must have changed that judgment. On those grounds he rejects an otherwise plausible account of akrasia, or weakness of will, that explains it in terms of the relative strengths of the agent's desires to act against and in accordance with their evaluative judgment. However, Watson seems to assume what I call a 'principle of closure of evaluation', a principle (...) that I argue can fail. The possibility of such failure of closure of evaluation means that Watson's argument can be resisted, allowing us to maintain this plausible account of akrasia. (shrink)

Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 89, Issue 2, Page 377-378, June 2011.

Men, culture and hegemonic masculinity: understanding the experience of prostate cancer Following a diagnosis of, and treatment for prostate cancer, there is an expectation that men will cope with, adjust to and accept the psychosocial impact on their lives and relationships. Yet, there is a limited qualitative world literature investigating the psychosocial experience of prostate cancer, and almost no literature exploring how masculinity mediates in such an experience. This paper will suggest that the experience of prostate cancer, the process by (...) which it is investigated, and the way in which it is understood has been shaped by an essentialist interpretation of gender, exemplified by hegemonic masculinity as the archetypal mechanism of male adaptation. In response to this static and limiting view of masculinity, this paper will offer a reframe of hegemonic masculinity. This reframe, being more aligned with common experience, will portray masculinity as a dynamic and contextual construct, better understood as one of a number of cultural reference points around which each man organises and adopts behaviour. It will be suggested that the extant literature, in being organised around hegemonic masculinity, obfuscates the experience of prostate cancer and acts to render covert any collateral masculinities, public or private, that may also be operating. (shrink)