Noûs 52 (3):508-529 (2018)

Authors
Matthew Chrisman
University of Edinburgh
Abstract
On the assumption that genuinely normative demands concern things connected in some way to our agency, i.e. what we exercise in doing things with or for reasons, epistemologists face an important question: are there genuine epistemic norms governing belief, and if so where in the vicinity of belief are we to find the requisite cognitive agency? Extant accounts of cognitive agency tend to focus on belief itself or the event of belief-formation to answer this question, to the exclusion of the activity of maintaining a system of beliefs. This paper argues that a full account of epistemic normativity will need to make sense of this activity as a core locus of cognitive agency. This idea is used to motivate the conclusion that one important and often overlooked kind of epistemic norms is the kind of norms governing the various cognitive activities by which we check, sustain, and adjust our belief systems.
Keywords cognitive agency  doxastic voluntarism  virtue epistemology  belief
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DOI 10.1111/nous.12184
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References found in this work BETA

Doxastic Deliberation.Nishi Shah & J. David Velleman - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (4):497-534.
Problems of the Self.Bernard Williams - 1973 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 37 (3):551-551.

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Citations of this work BETA

Epistemic Blame.Cameron Boult - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (8):e12762.
Inference as a Mental Act.David Hunter - forthcoming - In Michael Brent (ed.), Mental Action.

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