Theoria 82 (3):274–284 (2016)

Tsung-Hsing Ho
National Chung Cheng University
Virtue epistemology maintains that epistemic normativity is a kind of performance normativity, according to which evaluating a belief is like evaluating a sport or musical performance. I examine this thesis through the objection that a belief cannot be evaluated as a performance because it is not a performance but a state. I argue that virtue epistemology can be defended on the grounds that we often evaluate a performance through evaluating the result of the performance. The upshot of my account is that when a belief is evaluated under performance normativity, what we evaluate is not belief, but cognitive performance. My account of virtue epistemology offers a simple explanation of why knowledge is more valuable than true belief
Keywords performance normativity  John Greco  Meno problem  epistemic normativity  value of knowledge  Ernest Sosa  virtue epistemology  swamping problem
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DOI 10.1111/theo.12098
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References found in this work BETA

Knowing Full Well.Ernest Sosa - 2010 - Princeton University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

La Verdad en el Gnosticismo.Clayton Littlejohn - 2016 - Análisis. Revista de Investigación Filosófica 3:217-241.
The Truth in Gnosticism.Clayton Littlejohn - forthcoming - Análisis. Revista de Investigación Filosófica.

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