A Note on Logical Paradoxes and Aristotelian Square of Opposition

Abstract

According to Aristotle if a universal proposition (for example: “All men are white”) is true, its contrary proposition (“All men are not white”) must be false; and, according to Aristotle, if a universal proposition (for example: “All men are white”) is true, its contradictory proposition (“Not all men are white”) must be false. I agree with what Aristotle wrote about universal propositions, but there are universal propositions which have no contrary proposition and have no contradictory proposition. The proposition X “All the propositions that contradict this proposition are true” does not have the contrary proposition and does not have the contradictory proposition. In fact: FEX “All the propositions that contradict this proposition are not true” has a different subject: the subject of the proposition X is constituted by all the propositions that contradict the proposition X; by contrast, the subject of the proposition FEX is constituted by all the propositions that contradict the proposition FEX. And FOX “Not all the propositions that contradict this proposition are true” has a different subject: the subject of the proposition X is constituted by the propositions that contradict the proposition X; by contrast, the subject of the proposition FOX is constituted by the propositions that contradict the proposition FOX. According to Aristotle, a singular proposition (in his example: "Socrates is white") which is true must have its negative proposition ("Socrates is not white") which is false. I agree with Aristotle, but there are singular propositions which do not have the corresponding negative proposition. The proposition (or, rather, the pseudo-proposition) L “This same statement is not true” does not have the negative proposition because the proposition FNL “This same statement is true” has a different subject from the subject of the proposition L: the subject of the proposition L is the proposition L; by contrast, the subject of the proposition FNL is the proposition FNL. L and FNL cannot have the same subject. By contrast, the proposition M “This mount is entirely in Swiss territory” and the proposition NM “This mount is not entirely in Swiss territory” can have the same subject (for example, the Mount Eiger): in case the subject of the proposition M and the subject of the proposition NM is the same, M and NM are opposite propositions, NM is the negative proposition of M. By contrast, the proposition (or, rather, the pseudo-proposition) L "This same statement is not true" cannot have the corresponding negative proposition because FNL "This same statement is true" has a different subject: the subject of L is L ; by contrast, the subject of FNL is FNL. Then the paper continues by analyzing some variants of the liar’s paradox: L1 “The statement L1 is not true”; the so-called liar cycle; and the so-called Yablo’s paradox.

Links

PhilArchive

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

  • Only published works are available at libraries.

Similar books and articles

Paradoxes of intensionality.Dustin Tucker & Richmond H. Thomason - 2011 - Review of Symbolic Logic 4 (3):394-411.
Paradoxes.Piotr Łukowski - 2011 - Dordrecht and New York: Springer.
Philosophical Implications of Logical Paradoxes.Roy A. Sorensen - 2006 - In Dale Jacquette (ed.), A Companion to Philosophical Logic. Oxford, UK: Blackwell. pp. 131–142.
Liars and heaps: new essays on paradox.J. C. Beall (ed.) - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Definability and the Structure of Logical Paradoxes.Haixia Zhong - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):779 - 788.
Paradoxes and Hypodoxes of Time Travel.Peter Eldridge-Smith - 2007 - In Jan Lloyd Jones, Paul Campbell & Peter Wylie (eds.), Art and Time. Australian Scholarly Publishing. pp. 172--189.
Alethic Pluralism and Logical Paradoxes.Michele Lubrano - 2014 - In Fabio Bacchini, Stefano Caputo & Massimo Dell'Utri (eds.), New Frontiers in Truth. Cambridge Scholars Press. pp. 132-142.
The paradoxicon.Nicholas Falletta - 1983 - New York: Wiley.
Logical Paradoxes.James Cargile - 2006 - In Dale Jacquette (ed.), A Companion to Philosophical Logic. Oxford, UK: Blackwell. pp. 103–114.
Alethic vengeance.Kevin Scharp - 2007 - In J. C. Beall (ed.), Revenge of the Liar: New Essays on the Paradox. Oxford University Press.
Logical paradoxes.Barry Hartley Slater - 2001 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Analytics

Added to PP
2023-08-02

Downloads
2,110 (#4,090)

6 months
1,298 (#716)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references