Minds and Machines 13 (2):233-255 (2003)
AbstractThis paper defends a cognitive theory of those emotional reactions which motivate and constrain moral judgment. On this theory, moral emotions result from mental faculties specialized for automatically producing feelings of approval or disapproval in response to mental representations of various social situations and actions. These faculties are modules in Fodor's sense, since they are informationally encapsulated, specialized, and contain innate information about social situations. The paper also tries to shed light on which moral modules there are, which of these modules we share with non-human primates, and on the (pre-)history and development of this modular system from pre-humans through gatherer-hunters and on to modern (i.e. arablist) humans. The theory is not, however, meant to explain all moral reasoning. It is plausible that a non-modular intelligence at least sometimes play a role in conscious moral thought. However, even non-modular moral reasoning is initiated and constrained by moral emotions having modular sources.
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References found in this work
The Mind Doesn’T Work That Way: The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology.Jerry A. Fodor - 2000 - MIT Press.
Computation and Cognition: Issues in the Foundation of Cognitive Science.Zenon W. Pylyshyn - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):111-32.
Exaptation–A Missing Term in the Science of Form.Stephen Jay Gould & Elisabeth S. Vrba - 1982 - In David L. Hull & Michael Ruse (eds.), The Philosophy of Biology. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work
Using a Relational Models Perspective to Understand Normatively Appropriate Conduct in Ethical Leadership.Steffen Giessner & Niels van Quaquebeke - 2010 - Journal of Business Ethics 95 (S1):43 - 55.
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