Colors are sensible qualities. They are qualities that objects are perceived to have. Thus, when Norm, a normal perceiver, perceives a blue bead, the bead is perceived have a certain quality, perceived blueness. `Quality', here, is no mere synonym for property; rather, a quality is a kind of property a qualitative, as opposed to quan• titative, property. (The quantitative is a way of contrasting with the qualitative perhaps not the only way.).

Proponents of political liberalism standardly assume that the citizens of an ideal liberal society would be overwhelmingly reasonable. I argue that this assumption violates political liberalism's own constraints of realism—constraints that are necessary to frame the central problem that political liberalism aims to solve, that is, the problem of reasonable pluralism. To be consistent with these constraints, political liberalism must recognize that, as with reasonable pluralism, widespread support for unreasonable moral and political views is an inevitable feature of (...) any liberal society. I call this the fact of unreasonable pluralism. This fact threatens Rawlsian political liberalism's account of stability because an overlapping consensus cannot stably order a society pervaded by unreasonable views. My argument also raises questions about the coherence of Rawls's conception of ideal theory. (shrink)

This paper explores an apparent tension between two widely held views about logic: that logic is normative and that there are multiple equally legitimate logics. The tension is this. If logic is normative, it tells us something about how we ought to reason. If, as the pluralist would have it, there are several correct logics, those logics make incompatible recommendations as to how we ought to reason. But then which of these logics should we look to for normative guidance? I (...) argue that inasmuch as pluralism draws its motivation from its ability to defuse logical disputes—that is, disputes between advocates of rival logics—it is unable to provide an answer: pluralism collapses into monism with respect to either the strongest or the weakest admissible logic. (shrink)

I argue for accepting a pluralist approach to species, while rejecting the realism about species espoused by P. Kitcher and a number of other philosophers of biology. I develop an alternative view of species concepts as divisions of organisms into groups for study which are relative to the systematic explanatory interests of biologists at a particular time. I also show how this conception resolves a number of difficult puzzles which plague the application of particular species concepts.

We introduce a new type of pluralism about biological function that, in contrast to existing, demonstrates a practical integration among the term’s different meanings. In particular, we show how to generalize Sandra Mitchell’s notion of integrative pluralism to circumstances where multiple epistemic tools of the same type are jointly necessary to solve scientific problems. We argue that the multiple definitions of biological function operate jointly in this way based on how biologists explain the evolution of protein function. To (...) clarify how our account relates to existing views, we introduce a general typology for monist and pluralist accounts along with standardized criteria for judging which is best supported by evidence. (shrink)

What is truth? What precisely is it that truths have that falsehoods lack? Pluralists about truth (or “alethic pluralists”) tend to answer these questions by saying that there is more than one way for a proposition, sentence, belief—or any chosen truth-bearer—to be true. In this paper, I argue that two of the most influential formations of alethic pluralism, those of Wright (1992, 2003a) and Lynch (2009), are subject to serious problems. I outline a new formulation, which I call “simple (...) determination pluralism,” that I claim offers better prospects for alethic pluralism, with the potential to have applications for pluralist theories beyond truth. (shrink)

I defend a radical interpretation of biological populations—what I call population pluralism—which holds that there are many ways that a particular grouping of individuals can be related such that the grouping satisfies the conditions necessary for those individuals to evolve together. More constraining accounts of biological populations face empirical counter-examples and conceptual difficulties. One of the most intuitive and frequently employed conditions, causal connectivity—itself beset with numerous difficulties—is best construed by considering the relevant causal relations as ‘thick’ causal concepts. (...) I argue that the fine-grained causal relations that could constitute membership in a biological population are huge in number and many are manifested by degree, and thus we can construe population membership as being defined by massively multidimensional constructs, the differences between which are largely arbitrary. I end by showing that positions in two recent debates in theoretical biology depend on a view of biological populations at odds with the pluralism defended here. (shrink)

Official documents, such as the Word Anti-Doping Code (WADC), argue that sport can be deemed a homogenous and unitary concept. Even where different sports have varying characteristics, the homogenous view of a given sport (‘a sport’ or ‘the sport’) persists. The WADC, international and national sport associations aim to protect the spirit of (the) sport. In this picture, the intersection of sporting integrity and legal processes occupies a vital place. The article will posit that, from a legal perspective sport is (...) heterogeneous due to its governance, regulation, adjudication, and enforcement structures. International and national associations, such as sport federations and leagues, have separate normative orders. These normative orders lead to differences in ensuring sporting integrity. A plural normative environment is inherent in sport; thus, we need to deal with it. The article will conclude that although harmonising norms and interpretations related to sporting integrity through national and global institutions may be acceptable, these must be achieved by promoting good governance and human rights. (shrink)

With the increasing degrees A.I.s and machines are applied across different social contexts, the need for implementing ethics in A.I.s is pressing. In this paper, we argue for a pluralist hybrid model for the implementation of moral A.I.s. We first survey current approaches to moral A.I.s and their inherent limitations. Then we propose the pluralist hybrid approach and show how these limitations of moral A.I.s can be partly alleviated by the pluralist hybrid approach. The core ethical decision-making capacity of an (...) A.I. based on the pluralist hybrid approach consists of two systems. The first is a deterministic algorithm system that incorporates different moral rules for making explicit moral decisions. The second is a machine learning system that calculates the value of the variables required by the application of moral principles. The pluralist hybrid system is better than the existing proposals as (i) it better addresses the moral disagreement problem of the top-down approach by including different moral principles, while (ii) it reduces the opacity of ethical decision-making compared with a bottom-up system by implementing explicit moral principles for moral decision making. (shrink)

Let’s start with compositional pluralism. Elsewhere I’ve defended compositional pluralism, which we can provisionally understand as the doctrine that there is more than one basic parthood relation. (You might wonder what I mean by “basic”. We’ll discuss this in a bit.) On the metaphysics I currently favor, there are regions of spacetime and material objects, each of which enjoy bear a distinct parthood relation to members of their own kind. Perhaps there are other kinds of objects that enjoy (...) a kind of parthood relation other than the ones enjoyed by material objects and regions of spacetime. Perhaps, for example, there are facts; I’ve been wavering over whether to embrace these entities for years now. However, I’m reasonably confident that if there are facts than the kind of parthood relation that facts bear to that which composes them is not the kind of parthood relation enjoyed by material objects or regions of spacetime. More on why I am reasonably confident later. (shrink)

The starting point of this paper is a version of intra-theoretical pluralism that was recently proposed by Hjortland [2013]. In a first move, I use synonymy-relations to formulate an intuitively compelling objection against Hjortland's claim that, if one uses a single calculus to characterise the consequence relations of the paraconsistent logic LP and the paracomplete logic K3, one immediately obtains multiple consequence relations for a single language and hence a reply to the Quinean charge of meaning variance. In a (...) second move, I explain how a natural generalisation of the notion of synonymy can be used to counter this objection, but I also show how the solution can be turned into an equally devastating ‘one logic after all’ type of objection. Finally, I propose the general diagnosis that these problems could only arise in the presence of conceptual distinctions that are too coarse to accommodate coherent pluralist theses. T.. (shrink)

In this paper, I make the case for the view that there are many different kinds of dispositions, a view I call dispositional pluralism. The reason I think that this case needs to be made is to temper the tendency to make sweeping generalization about the nature of dispositions that go beyond conceptual truths. Examples of such generalizations include claims that all dispositions are intrinsic, essential, fundamental, or natural.! In order to counter this tendency, I will start by noting (...) the extent to which it is at odds with the semantics of dispositions, according to which there are many kinds of disposition ascriptions. From there, I will try to support a metaphysical claim that there are different kinds of dispositions. To bridge the gap between semantics and metaphysics, I appeal to epistemology. I'll consider the question "when do we have good reason to believe that a disposition ascription is true?" If our disposition ascriptions are true, then we are right about what kinds of dispositions things have, and what kinds of dispositions there are. I claim that our evidence for different kinds of dispositions is on a par; we have reason to believe that various kinds of dispositions are instantiated. (shrink)

In this paper, I offer a pluralistic framework for disagreement and I develop a strategy to account for the varieties of disagreement on the basis of the varieties of the truth across different domains of discourse. Truth-pluralism is thus sufficient for delivering pluralism about disagreement—that is, diaphonic pluralism.

A view with some considerable influence in current moral and political philosophy holds that there is a plurality of values, all of them fundamental and authoritative and yet, in some genuinely disconcerting way, in conflict . I shall call it ‘value-pluralism’.

James Tabery Helen Longino’s Studying Human Behavior is an overdue effort at a nonpartisan evaluation of the many scientific disciplines that study the nature and nurture of human behavior, arguing for the acceptance of the strengths and weaknesses of all approaches. After years of conflict, Longino makes the pluralist case for peaceful coexistence. Her analysis of the approaches raises the following question: how are we to understand the pluralistic relationship among the peacefully coexisting approaches? Longino is ironically rather unpluralistic about (...) her pluralism, forcing a choice between integrative pluralism and her preferred ineliminative pluralism. I hope to show that the analysis of approaches she offers actually accommodates a pluralism that is both integrative and ineliminative.Approaches to studying human behaviorPhilosophy of biology took shape as a discipline in the 1970s. This disciplinary formation over. (shrink)

When talking about truth, we ordinarily take ourselves to be talking about one-and-the-same thing. Alethic monists suggest that theorizing about truth ought to begin with this default or pre-reflective stance, and, subsequently, parlay it into a set of theoretical principles that are aptly summarized by the thesis that truth is one. Foremost among them is the invariance principle.

In this thought-provoking study, Jack Russell Weinstein suggests the foundations of liberalism can be found in the writings of Adam Smith, a pioneer of modern economic theory and a major figure in the Scottish Enlightenment. While offering an interpretive methodology for approaching Smith’s two major works, _The Theory of Moral Sentiments _and _The Wealth of Nations_, Weinstein argues against the libertarian interpretation of Smith, emphasizing his philosophies of education and rationality. Weinstein also demonstrates that Smith should be recognized for a (...) prescient theory of pluralism that prefigures current theories of cultural diversity. (shrink)

In this paper, I consider Alain Locke’s critical pragmatism to see how he might address the problem of racist literature, particularly, the use of stereotypes. For my purposes here, it will be assumed that stereotypes are sustained by evil and malicious intentions, whether consciously acknowledged or not. Two issues arise when considering Locke’s critical pragmatism. First, Locke denies the objective status of morality—objective in the sense that moral absolutes exist “out there” and can be classified rightly or wrongly. Thus, claiming (...) that stereotypes are “evil” must have a different connotation for Locke than one might assume. The second issue is that it has been argued that Locke creates and uses stereotypes himself. The paper will progress as follows: I first address Locke’s use of stereotypes, contending that Locke does not in fact use stereotypes. He has a notion of collective identity or representation that he uses as a heuristic to counteract racist uses of stereotypes. While similar to a stereotype, collective identity is qualitatively different. Next, I discuss Locke’s understanding of cultural pluralism as the tool with which Locke is able to address racist stereotypes, on the one hand, and defend his use of collective identity on the other. I conclude that though Locke’s account is useful it lacks the moral weight, which I would like, to condemn stereotypes as fully wrong. (shrink)

In an attempt to address some long-standing issues of epistemology, Hilary Kornblith proposes that knowledge is a natural kind the identification of which is the unique responsibility of one particular science: cognitive ethology. As Kornblith sees it, the natural kind thus picked out is knowledge as construed by reliabilism. Yet the claim that cognitive ethology has this special role has not convinced all critics. The present article argues that knowledge plays a causal and explanatory role within many of our more (...) fruitful current theories, diverging from the reliabilist conception even in disciplines that are closely related to cognitive ethology, and thus still dealing with knowledge as a natural as opposed to a social phenomenon, where special attention will be given to cognitive neuroscience. However, rather than discarding the natural kind approach altogether, it is argued that many of Kornblith’s insights can in fact be preserved within a framework that is both naturalist and pluralist. (shrink)

This article discusses the exegeses of two Qur'anic verses: Qur'an 2:143, which describes righteous Muslims as constituting a “middle/moderate community” (umma wasat) and Qur'an 5:66, which similarly describes righteous Jews and Christians as constituting a “balanced/moderate community” (umma muqtasida). Taken together, these verses clearly suggest that it is subscription to some common standard of righteousness and ethical conduct that determines the salvific nature of a religious community and not the denominational label it chooses to wear. Such a perspective offers the (...) possibility of formulating universal principles of ethical and moral conduct, which may contribute to the formation of a genuinely pluralist global society today. Through a close study of Qur'anic exegeses of these verses from the late first/seventh century to modern times, I retrieve some of the most prevalent Muslim understandings of “moderation” through time and dwell on their contemporary implications. (shrink)

This article examines whether it is possible to uphold one form of deflationism towards metaphysics, ontological pluralism, whilst maintaining metaphysical realism. The focus therefore is on one prominent deflationist who fits the definition of an ontological pluralist, Eli Hirsch, and his self-ascription as a realist. The article argues that ontological pluralism is not amenable to the ascription of realism under some basic intuitions as to what a “realist” position is committed to. These basic intuitions include a commitment to (...) more than a stuff-ontology, and a view that realism carries with it more than a rejection of idealism. This issue is more than merely terminological. The ascription of realism is an important classification in order to understand what sorts of entities can be the truthmakers within a given theory. “Realism” is thus an important term to understand the nature of the entities that a given theory accepts into its ontology. (shrink)

Recent scholarship has drawn attention to John Rawls’s concern with stability—a concern that, as Rawls himself notes, motivated Part III of A Theory of Justice and some of the more important changes of his political turn. For Rawls, the possibility of achieving ‘stability for the right reasons’ depends on citizens possessing sufficient moral motivation. I argue, however, that the moral psychology Rawls develops to show how such motivation would be cultivated and sustained does not cohere with his specific descriptions of (...) ‘pluralist ’ doctrines. Considering Rawls’s claims that ‘most’ citizens—both in contemporary liberal democracies and in the well-ordered society—possess such doctrines, this incompatibility threatens to undermine his stability arguments. Despite the enormous importance of pluralist doctrines and the potential difficulties they pose for Rawls’s project, remarkably little attention has been paid to them. By critically examining these difficulties, the article begins to address this oversight. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Serene Khader’s effort to develop a decolonized approach to transnational feminism takes a helpfully nonideal approach. Much of decolonial theory has criticized universalism in order to espouse pluralism. Khader attempts to develop a form of minimalist universalism compatible with a significant dose of pluralism in regard to how we understand liberation from gender-based forms of oppression, and she effectively shows how the nonideal, meliorative approach can do this. I address three issues here: (1) the serious challenge her (...) universalist account poses to critical theory and some other trends in continental philosophy; (2) the persuasive analysis of, approach to, and critique that she makes of ‘gender role eliminativism’ and (3) the epistemic and dialogic questions left remaining in her defense of feminist universalism, in relation to who can theoretically formulate the universal. (shrink)

Priority pluralism, perdurantism and that temporal gunk – where some interval of time is gunky iff every interval of it has a proper subinterval – is at least metaphysically possible, are three commonly held views in contemporary metaphysics. However, there cannot be a temporally gunky world where objects perdure, and where there are mereological simples. Given that – as I will argue – pluralists should be committed to atomism, and cannot plausibly revise their view to accommodate temporal gunk if (...) they are perdurantists, pluralism is incompatible with the combination of temporal gunk and perdurantism. Therefore, priority pluralism, perdurantism and the possibility of temporal gunk are jointly incompatible, and at least one of these views must be false. Subsequently, it means that at least one of the following views must be true: priority monism or metaphysical infinitism; endurantism; and/or that time is atomistic. The triad's inconsistency, then, has some interesting metaphysical implications. (shrink)

This paper examines the complex research landscape of contemporary suicidology from a philosophy of science perspective. I begin by unpacking the methods, concepts, and assumptions of some of the prominent approaches to studying suicide causation, including psychological autopsy studies, epidemiological studies, biological studies, and qualitative studies. I then analyze the different ways these approaches partition the causes of suicide, with particular emphasis on the ways they conceptualize the domain of mental disorder. I argue that these different ways of partitioning the (...) causal space and conceptualizing mental disorder result in incommensurabilities between the approaches. These incommensurabilities restrict the degrees to which the different approaches can be integrated, thus lending support to explanatory pluralism in the study of suicide causation. They also shed light on some of the philosophical underpinnings of the disagreement between mainstream suicidology and the emerging area of critical suicidology. (shrink)

This paper offers a new argument in favour of experiential pluralism about visual experience – the view that the nature of successful visual experience is different from the nature of unsuccessful visual experience. The argument appeals to the role of experience in explaining possession of ordinary abilities. In addition, the paper makes a methodological point about philosophical debates concerning the nature of perceptual experience: whether a given view about the nature of experience amounts to an interesting and substantive thesis (...) about our own minds depends on the significance of the psychological or mental kind claim made by it. This means that an adequate defence of a given view of the nature of experience must include articulation of the latter's significance qua psychological or mental kind. The argument advanced provides the material to meet this demand. In turn, this constitutes further support for the argument itself. (shrink)

This article seeks to interpret the striking divergence between the two judgments passed by the European Court of Human Rights in the Lautsi v Italy case in terms of value pluralism. The latter is a hotly debated position in ethics, brought to life in the second half of the twentieth century by Isaiah Berlin. Pluralism elucidates these in interesting ways. First, value pluralism sheds light on three major aspects of the trial before the European Court of Human (...) Rights: the nature of the collision of values, the discrepancy between the two decisions, and the rationale of the final judgment. Secondly, this is my thesis that while the first judgment fits ethical monism, which underlies Dworkin’s ‘one right answer’ theory, the second ruling chimes with pluralism. The pluralist spirit of the Grand Chamber’s final decision turned Europe away from the path of Americanization. (shrink)

O texto apresenta uma perspectiva cristológica plural na relação interreligiosa, a partir da visão de que cada expressão religiosa tem a sua proposta salvífica e de fé que devem ser aceitas, respeitadas, valorizadas e aprimoradas a partir de um diálogo e aproximação mútuas. Tal perspectiva não anula nem diminui o valor das identidades religiosas - no caso da fé cristã, a importância de Cristo -, mas leva-as a um aprofundamento e amadurecimento, movidos pelo diálogo e pela confrontação justa, amável e (...) corresponsável. Assim, a fé cristã, por exemplo, seria reinterpretada a partir do confronto dialógico e criativo com as demais fés. O mesmo deve se dar com toda e qualquer tradição religiosa. Consideramos que tal visão, em certo sentido, supera outros modelos como aquele que considera Jesus Cristo e a Igreja como caminho exclusivo de salvação; o que considera Jesus Cristo como caminho de salvação para todos, ainda que implicitamente, o que se denominou inclusivismo; e a perspectiva relativista na qual Jesus é o caminho para os cristãos, enquanto para os outros o caminho é a sua própria tradição, sem maiores esforços de autocríticas, revisões e mútua interpelação. Na visão pluralista, os elementos chaves da vivência religiosa e humana em geral são alteridade, respeito à diferença e o diálogo e cooperação prática e ética em torno da busca da justiça, da paz e do bem-comum. A aproximação e o diálogo entre grupos de distintas expressões religiosas cooperam para que elas possam construir ou reconstruir suas identidades e princípios fundantes. Palavras-Chave : Teologia das religiões. Cristologia pluralista. Diálogo inter-religioso. Asbtract This essay presents a plural Christological perspective towards inter-religious relationships, from the perspective that every religious expression has its own faith and salvific proposal that should be accepted, respected, properly valued and improved through mutual approach and dialogue. Such perspective does not negate nor diminishes the value of religious identities – in the case of the Christian faith, the importance of Christ – but leads them to deepen and mature themselves, being moved by dialogue and fair confrontation, one that is loving and co-responsible. Thus, the Christian faith, for instance, would be reinterpreted by means of creative dialogical confrontation vis-a-vis other faiths. The same should take place with each and every religious tradition. We consider that this understanding, in a certain way, supersedes other models such as that which considers Jesus Christ and the Church as the only and exclusive means of salvation; the one that considers Jesus Christ as the way of salvation for everyone, even if implicitly stated, what has been termed as inclusivism; and the relativistic perspective, in which Jesus is the way for Christians, while for others the way is their own tradition, without greater efforts on self-criticism, self-revision and mutual interpellation. In the pluralist perspective, the key elements of religious life and human life in general are alterity, respect for differences, dialogue and mutual practical and ethical cooperation for justice and common well-being. The mutual approach and dialogue between groups belonging to distinct religious expressions cooperate in order for them to construct or reconstruct their identities and founding principles. Keywords: Theology of religions. Pluralist Christology. Inter-religious dialogue. (shrink)

‘Pluralism’ may be an ambiguous term. But it is not the multitude of the word's meanings but the multitude of sorts of thing that ‘pluralists’ might be claiming to be not-single-but-plural that generates unclarity about what any ‘pluralist’ position amounts to. Take ethics: a ‘pluralist’ might be maintaining, as against say an ethical hedonist of a Benthamite sort, that there is more than one sort of thing ‘good in itself. Another ‘pluralist’ might maintain that there is more than one (...) sort of life that counts as a ‘good way of life’. Or that not all moral duties are forms of the duty to be truthful. Or that there is more than one framework in terms of which experiences, actions or lives can properly be assessed. There is a problem in understanding what it is that is supposed to be counted: one-or-many of what? While the value today of William James’s popular essays in what we might now call ‘value pluralism’ far exceeds their role in illustrating this difficulty, they do exemplify it. James of course described himself as a ‘pluralist’; he was on the flagship of that movement. But just to what extent and in what respects remains unclear. (shrink)

How the Study of Consciousness and Mapping Spiritual Experiences Can Reshape Religious Methodology This special issue of the Journal of Consciousness Studies throws down a methodological challenge to the field of Religious Studies. Over the last half century, the academic study of religion has developed a variety of angles and approaches: structuralist, Eliadian, Marxist, feminist, and so on. Recently, approaches popular in many institutions and departments have centred on linguistic and cultural analysis, notably the postmodern and deconstructivist approaches championed by (...) Derrida and others. With the dawn of the interdisciplinary field of the study of human consciousness, and with this issue of the Journal of Consciousness Studies, we challenge this prevailing approach by presenting readers with articles analysing religion, spirituality, and spiritual experience, not solely as cultural phenomena, but as phenomena that can be related to human physiology, and a kind of pan-human technology of human spiritual development. (shrink)

Some problems that arise in the account given by Thomasma and Pellegrino [6] of the foundations of medical ethics in a philosophy of medicine are addressed, in particular questions of a conceptual character about treating therelatum of medicine as health. Which concept of health is appropriate and which will bear the burden of the position thomasma and Pellegrino advance? It is argued that the proper relationship of medicine is one between a healer and developing embodied minds. As a consequence, the (...) project of providing a univocal account of the nature of medicine fails. Instead, pluralism infects philosophy and medicine, resulting in different philosophies of medicine. From these philosophies of medicine will follow not a single medical ethics but a variety. (shrink)

This chapter talks about ethical deliberations that may be individual, potentially based on thought experiences or overhanging and discusses a real confrontation of evaluations and the deliberations of other individuals. This is one of the new elements introduced by participatory technology assessment (PTA), particularly in Europe. Stakeholder participation has been promoted by European agencies as a pillar of responsible research and innovation (RRI), confirming the need to consider the risks of exposure to the deliberations of others. The chapter describes the (...) resources offered by certain political philosophers who considered proposing the best possible systems for managing pluralism. It discusses the criteria of one of the most promising political theories: deliberative democracy. The qualification of this theory will prove useful in managing the cohabitation of individual and collective evaluation. The chapter considers a number of possible improvements to this theory, notably with regard to one of its major components: ethical arguments. (shrink)

Genes controlling the choice of sexual strategy must be sensitive to critical environmental contingencies, including the presence of other strategically relevant genetic traits. To determine which strategy works best for each individual, one must assess both its environment and itself within that environment. Psychosexual development involves an assessment of sociosexual affordances, strategically calibrating optimal utilization of physical and psychosocial assets.

Green evaluates the efficacy of USAID against the ethical and practical issues likely to influence its future success.