Philosophical Psychology 31 (1):1-24 (2018)

Authors
Jonny Lee
University of Murcia
Abstract
The battle over the proper place of mental representation in cognitive science is often portrayed as a clash between realism and eliminativism. But this simple dichotomy belies the variety of different ontological positions available. This article investigates the various stances that one can adopt toward the ontology of mental representation, and in so doing, shows that eliminativism is in fact best understood as two distinct positions: a posteriori eliminativism and a priori eliminativism. Furthermore, I show that a priori eliminativism faces two crippling challenges. I argue that once we put a priori eliminativism aside, determining the ultimate ontological status of representation can be postponed while we assess its utility across different domains of cognitive science—something all remaining positions can agree on.
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Reprint years 2017, 2018
DOI 10.1080/09515089.2017.1362550
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References found in this work BETA

Real Patterns.Daniel C. Dennett - 1991 - Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):27-51.
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The Content of Perceptual Experience.John McDowell - 1994 - Philosophical Quarterly 44 (175):190.

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